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Protecting Offshore Areas from Oil and 
Gas Leasing: Presidential Authority 
under the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act and the Antiquities Act 
Robert T. Anderson* 
 For over one hundred years, presidents of both parties have used 
executive power to protect America’s lands and waters. Until the second half of 
the twentieth century, however, little attention was given to protecting the 
marine ecosystem. Federal authority reaches out to two hundred miles or more 
in the oceans off the United States, covering an area known as the Outer 
Continental Shelf. Federal interest in the area historically focused on 
developing oil and gas reserves and ensuring that the area was open to trade 
and commerce. The area is also very important for indigenous subsistence uses 
and commercial and sport fisheries. Yet it has received scant attention from 
Congress in terms of environmental protection. Climate change and ocean 
acidification have increased recognition of the marine ecosystem’s importance 
to the overall health of the planet. This Article reviews President Obama’s 
recent withdrawal of swaths of the outer continental shelf from oil and gas 
leasing under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. It argues that while 
Congress has paramount authority over the outer continental shelf and retains 
the authority to undo conservation actions, it has delegated limited 
conservation authority to the president under section 12(a) of the Act. Thus, 
President Obama’s recent protective measures taken under the Act may only be 
altered by Congress—not by a subsequent president. This Article compares the 
president’s withdrawal authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
to the president’s authority to establish national monuments under the 
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Antiquities Act. It argues that Congress did not delegate power to revoke 
national monument designations under the Antiquities Act, nor permanent 
withdrawals under section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution grants Congress plenary authority over federal public 
lands, and Congress has used that power in myriad ways that range from 
transfers to states and private parties to conservation and retention in federal 
ownership.1 Since the early twentieth century, Congress has protected some 
federal lands as wilderness areas and national parks, and authorized multiple 
uses on national forest and Bureau of Land Management lands.2 National 
 
 1.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
 2.  Compare Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012) (designating certain lands 
as “wilderness areas” and protecting them from development), and National Park Service Organic Act 
of 1916, ch. 408, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 54 U.S.C.) (committing the 
federal government to the preservation of national parks through the National Park Service), with 
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2012) (authorizing the federal 
government to allow resource extraction from national forests while considering sustained yield and 
recreational, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes), and Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782 (2012) (authorizing the federal government to allow development and 
resource extraction on federal lands while considering “scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, 
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values”). “‘Multiple use 
management’ is a deceptively simple term that describes the enormously complicated task of striking a 
balance among the many competing uses to which land can be put, ‘including, but not limited to, 
recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] natural scenic, 
scientific and historical values.’” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004) (citing 43 
U.S.C. § 1702(c)). The Supreme Court brushed aside challenges to Congress’s regulatory power in Light 
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wildlife refuges occupy a middle ground in terms of protective management.3 
In each instance, Congress provided statutory directives to guide federal 
management, but necessarily left to the executive branch the task of adopting 
and enforcing more detailed rules.4 In addition to administering lands set aside 
for various purposes by Congress, the president has also exercised unilateral 
management authority over public lands in the face of congressional inaction 
by withdrawing lands from oil and gas production, establishing bird refuges, 
and setting aside Indian reservations.5 This is because the president has a major 
role in managing public resources as head of the executive branch. Congress 
also provided presidents with delegated conservation authority in the 
Antiquities Act of 1906: “The President may, in the President’s discretion, 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated on 
land owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be national 
monuments.”6 The Antiquities Act has been used by 16 presidents since 1906 
to proclaim 157 national monuments.7 As discussed below, the Act does not 
include a grant of power to eliminate or modify monuments—now a matter of 
intense controversy and litigation.8 
 
v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (“[The] United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms 
on which its property may be used.”).  
 3.  Thus, the National Wildlife Refuge system’s primary purpose is conservation of fish and 
wildlife populations. Refuges may also be open to hunting and other recreational activities not 
inconsistent with their primary purposes. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(3)(D) (2012). 
 4.  See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911). 
 5.  See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 470, 483 (1915); David H. Getches, 
Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
279, 283, 285–86, 297 (1982). 
 6.  Pub. L. No. 59-209, § 2, 34 Stat. 225, 225 (1906) (codified as amended in 54 U.S.C. § 
320301(a) (Supp. 2017)). 
 7.  The National Park Service published a list of 152 national monuments created from 1906 
through September 15, 2016. Antiquities Act 1906–2006, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/ 
archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm (last updated May 8, 2017). President Obama 
proclaimed five additional monuments after that date. Monuments Protected Under the Antiquities Act, 
NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/2658-
monuments-protected-under-the-antiquities-act. The total area protected under the Antiquities Act 
during the Obama Administration is estimated at over 550 million acres of land and water—far more 
than any other president, and a matter of current controversy. See Coral Davenport, Obama Designates 
Monuments in Nevada and Utah, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, Dec. 29, 2016, at A14. See generally Mark Squillace et 
al., Essay, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 55 (2017), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/files/Hecht%20PDF. 
pdf. 
         8.      President Trump issued an executive order directing the secretary of the interior to solicit 
comments to assess public support for selected monuments. Review of Designations under the 
Antiquities Act, Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429, 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017). The secretary of 
the interior solicited comments due by June 10, 2017. Review of Certain National Monuments 
Established since 1996; Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,016, 22,016 (May 
11, 2017). Recommendations were reportedly sent to President Trump on August 24, 2017. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Zinke Sends Monument Report to the White House (Aug. 
24, 2017), available at https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-sends-monument-report-
white-house. President Trump issued proclamations “Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument” 
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But what about the oceans? The United States asserts jurisdiction over 
coastal waters two hundred miles or more beyond the coastline under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).9 The outer continental shelf (OCS) in 
important ways stands on similar footing to public domain lands, but only a few 
statutes speak to environmental protection of marine resources.10 Until 
recently, federal policy primarily pursued economic exploitation, in part 
because the OCS lacked the conservation advocacy that brought about 
wilderness designations, national parks, wildlife refuges and national forests in 
the continental United States.11 There are ten proclamations establishing 
 
Procl. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58081 (Dec. 4, 2017), and “Modifying the Grand Staircase Escalante National 
Monument.” Procl. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58089 (Dec. 4, 2017). See Remarks by President Trump on 
Antiquities Act Designations (Dec. 4, 2017), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-antiquities-act-designations. President Trump was sued 
over both “modifications” on the ground that the Antiquities Act does not authorize such modifications 
or revocation of an established monument. See Hopi Tribe, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., No: 1:17-
cv-02590 (D.D.C.) (complaint filed, December 5, 2017, on behalf of the Hopi Tribe, Navajo Nation, Ute 
Indian Tribe Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, and the Zuni Tribe). 
 9.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 4, 67 Stat. 462, 462 (1953) 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)); see ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL33404, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1–4 (2014) (summarizing 
federal ocean resource jurisdiction). According to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the agency 
principally charged with jurisdiction over ocean mineral resource development,  
[t]he OCS refers to 1.7 billion acres of Federal submerged lands, subsoil, and seabed 
generally beginning 3 nautical miles off the coastline (for most states) and extending for at 
least 200 nautical miles to the edge of the Exclusive Economic Zone, or even farther if the 
continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles.  
The Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/The-Continental-
Shelf/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). In the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management 
Act, the United States asserted “sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving, 
and managing all fish, within the exclusive economic zone” previously established by executive order. 
16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2012) (citing Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983)). 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea also recognizes the 200 mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), and is part of customary law recognized by the United States. See Mayagüezanos por la 
Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 198 F.3d 297, 305 n.14 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The United States has 
taken the position that the twelve-mile territorial sea and the two-hundred-mile EEZ are declarative of 
customary international law.”) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, pt. III, 
introductory note, at 145); Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1988); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 
Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983); Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 1983 Pub. Papers 378, 379 (Mar. 
10, 1983).”); see also James E. Hickey, Jr., The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 373–75 (Donald C. Baur et al. eds., 2015).  
 10.  See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1361. The Marine 
Mammal Protection Act is counted by some as a first step by Congress toward ecosystem-based 
management in the oceans. See Donald C. Baur et al., Legal Authorities of Ecosystem-Based 
Management in Coastal and Ocean Areas, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 9, at 
703.  
 11.  See Davenport, supra note 7; CENTER FOR NATURAL AREAS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED 
FOR A NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES PROGRAM 1 (Prepared for the Department of Commerce 1977) 
(“The confrontation over the preservation and wise utilization of land-based resources continues. But it 
is only recently that such a confrontation has begun over marine-related resources.”). Cf., Warren M. 
Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 33–36 
(1953) (explaining the genesis of the United States’ interest in the economic exploitation of the natural 
resources of the OCS); Robin Kundis Craig, Treating Offshore Submerged Lands As Public Lands: A 
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national monuments in marine areas,12 along with thirteen designated marine 
sanctuaries.13 While fishing opportunities are provided in all coastal areas, 
marine waters off the coast of Alaska are unique due to their importance for 
indigenous subsistence activities, and are subject to the aboriginal rights of 
Alaska Natives.14 
The president has a legal tool in addition to the Antiquities Act that he can 
use to protect the oceans. This Article examines President Obama’s use of 
OCSLA to protect certain marine areas from mineral exploration and 
production activity. It compares the durability of these actions with national 
monuments established under the Antiquities Act. While Congress enacted 
OCSLA partly to advance commercial development of oil and gas resources 
under federal supervision, it included a provision commonly known as section 
12(a), which authorized the president to withdraw areas from oil and gas 
leasing “from time to time.”15 Presidents before Obama used section 12(a) to 
permanently protect important areas off the coasts of Florida and California, 
along with areas formally designated as marine sanctuaries.16 President 
Obama’s withdrawals stand out for their broad geographic scope and for their 
express recognition of Alaska Native dependence on marine resources for 
subsistence uses. President Obama protected approximately 160 million acres 
 
Historical Perspective, 34 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 53 (2013) (“[I]t is not an exaggeration 
to view the U.S. law of the continental shelf as the law of offshore oil and gas development . . . .”). 
 12.  See Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument, Proclamation No. 9496, 
81 Fed. Reg. 65,161 (Sept. 15, 2016); Marianas Trench National Monument, Proclamation No. 8335, 74 
Fed. Reg. 1557 (Jan. 6, 2009); Pacific Remote Islands National Monument, Proclamation No. 8336, 74 
Fed. Reg. 1565 (Jan. 6, 2009); Rose Atoll National Monument, Proclamation No. 8337, 74 Fed. Reg. 
1577 (Jan. 6, 2009); World War II Valor in the Pacific National Monument, Proclamation No. 8327, 73 
Fed. Reg. 75,293 (Dec. 5, 2008); Northwestern Hawaiian Islands National Monument, Proclamation No. 
8031, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,443 (June 15, 2006) (redesignated as Papahānaumokuākea Marine National 
Monument, Proclamation No. 8112, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,031 (Feb. 28, 2007)); Virgin Islands Coral Reef 
National Monument, Proclamation No. 7399, 66 Fed. Reg. 7364 (Jan. 17, 2001); California Coastal 
National Monument, Proclamation No. 7264, 65 Fed. Reg. 2821 (Jan. 11, 2000); Buck Island National 
Monument, Proclamation No. 3443, 27 Fed. Reg. 31 (Dec. 28, 1961); Channel Islands National 
Monument, Proclamation No. 2281, 52 Stat. 1541 (Apr. 26, 1938). National monuments may be 
established “on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government.” 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (Supp. 
2017). The United States asserts ownership and control of the OCS. See infra Part II. 
 13.  See Kim D. Connolly, Marine Protected Areas, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY, 
supra note 9, at 601 (discussing the thirteen national marine sanctuaries designated by the Secretary of 
Commerce as of 2015); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1431(c) (“There is established the National Marine 
Sanctuary System, which shall consist of national marine sanctuaries designated by the Secretary in 
accordance with this chapter.”). 
 14.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b). In recognition of the importance of marine mammals for subsistence 
uses, the Marine Mammal Protection Act’s moratorium on the taking of marine mammals does not apply 
to Alaska Natives who dwell on the coast of Alaska. Id.   
 15.  43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2012). 
 16.  See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental 
Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1111 (June 12, 1998) (describing the 
protection of marine sanctuaries); Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development, 26 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1006 (June 26, 1990); Establishment of Santa Barbara Channel Ecological 
Preserve, 34 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Mar. 26, 1969); Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve, Proclamation No. 3339, 
25 Fed. Reg. 2352 (Mar. 15, 1960). 
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from future oil and gas leasing,17 using his authority 5 times and explicitly 
providing that such withdrawals shall be “without specific expiration.”18 
The withdrawals were well publicized and struck a nerve with the 
proponents of unrestricted oil and gas development.19 Professor Charles 
Wilkinson aptly termed such outmoded ideas about resource exploitation the 
“lords of yesterday.”20 While these resource exploitation ideas had their 
genesis in the context of western public land and water policy, they linger in 
the field of mineral resource development in the OCS. Now, the pro-
development interests have found an ally in the Trump Administration. Upon 
the urging of fossil fuel proponents, President Trump took executive action 
purporting to revoke several of Obama’s OCSLA withdrawal orders.21 
 
 17.  Coral Davenport, Obama Bans Drilling in Parts of the Atlantic and Arctic, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Dec. 
20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/us/obama-drilling-ban-arctic-atlantic.html (reporting 
on the withdrawal of 3.8 million acres of the Atlantic and 115 million acres of the Arctic from future 
leasing); Mike Boots & Dan Utech, President Obama Protects Untouched Marine Wilderness in Alaska, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/01/27/ 
president-obama-protects-untouched-marine-wilderness-alaska (discussing the withdrawal of 9.8 million 
acres of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas from future leasing); Press Release, The White House, President 
Obama Protects Alaska’s Bristol Bay From Future Oil and Gas Drilling (Dec. 16, 2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/16/president-obama-protects-alaska-s-
bristol-bay-future-oil-and-gas-drilling (describing the withdrawal of 32.5 million acres of Bristol Bay 
from future leasing). 
 18.  Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer 
Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 20, 2016) (expanding 
the withdrawals from future leasing in the Arctic “without specific expiration”); Memorandum on 
Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral 
Leasing, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 20, 2016) (withdrawing Atlantic canyons from future 
leasing “without specific expiration”); Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No. 13,754, 
81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, 90,670 (Dec. 9, 2016) (establishing North Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area and 
withdrawing certain areas from leasing “without specific expiration”); Memorandum on Withdrawal of 
Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 
2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 27, 2015) (withdrawing Beaufort and Chukchi Seas from future 
leasing “without specific expiration”); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United 
States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 16, 
2014) (withdrawing Bristol Bay from future leasing “without specific expiration”). Only the four 
withdrawals off the coast of Alaska reference Native subsistence uses. 
 19.  See Davenport, supra note 17; Sarah Emerson, Obama Blocked Trump from Drilling the 
Arctic and Atlantic with This Obscure Law, MOTHERBOARD (Dec. 21, 2016), https://motherboard. 
vice.com/en_us/article/obama-permanently-withdraw-drilling-arctic-atlantic-outer-continental-shelf-
lands-act; Kevin Ewing & Michael Weller, Obama Bans Drilling Offshore Atlantic, Arctic – But For 
How Long?, BRACEWELL (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.energylegalblog.com/blog/2016/12/21/obama-
bans-drilling-offshore-atlantic-arctic-–-how-long; Daniel J. Graeber, Oil Industry Asks Trump about 
Drilling Offshore, UPI (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.upi.com/Oil-industry-asks-Trump-about-drilling-
offshore/2461488369535/.  
 20.  CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE 
OF THE WEST xiii (1992) (using the phrase to describe the historical exploitation of public lands and 
resources in the United States). 
 21.      Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec. Order No. 13,795, § 5, 82 
Fed. Reg. 20,815, 20,816 (Apr. 28, 2017). Modification of the Withdrawal of Areas of the Outer 
Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition: The body text in each of the memoranda of withdrawal 
from disposition by leasing of the United States Outer Continental Shelf issued on December 20, 2016, 
January 27, 2015, and July 14, 2008, is modified to read, in its entirety, as follows: 
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This Article situates President Obama’s OCSLA withdrawal orders in the 
larger field of federal public land management. In particular, it reviews the law 
surrounding the designation of national monuments under the Antiquities Act, 
and compares that authority to OCSLA’s section 12(a) withdrawal provision. 
Whether withdrawals under either statute may be undone is sharply 
contested.22 No national monument designation has ever been overturned by a 
subsequent president, and the only administrative authority on point reasoned 
that the president lacks such authority.23 This Article argues that the president’s 
withdrawal authority under section 12(a) is likewise a limited delegation of 
authority from Congress, and that only Congress may undo a section 12(a) 
withdrawal. While President Trump’s action purported to revoke the Obama 
withdrawals, that action will not result in any immediate lease sales in the 
affected areas because OCSLA requires additional processes before any area 
may be eligible for leasing. The Trump Administration is proceeding with such 
actions now, and would open the entire OCS to oil and gas leasing, except for 
Marine Sanctuaries, Bristol Bay in Alaska, and the Eastern Gulf of Mexico.24 
The question will be litigated in a lawsuit alleging that President Trump’s 
action violates separation of powers principles and is beyond his statutory 
authority.25 
Part I of this Article outlines the principles of federal authority over 
federal public lands within state boundaries and the OCS. Part II reviews and 
compares the use of the Antiquities Act and OCSLA for conservation purposes. 
Part III provides an overview of the law regarding national monuments. 
Finally, Part IV discusses the durability of mineral leasing withdrawals under 
OCSLA. 
 
Under the authority vested in me as President of the United States, including 
section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1341(a), I 
hereby withdraw from disposition by leasing, for a time period without specific 
expiration, those areas of the Outer Continental Shelf designated as of July 14, 
2008, as Marine Sanctuaries under the Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1431-1434, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq. 
 22.  See Julie Turkewitz, Battle over Bears Ears Heats Up as Trump Rethinks Its Monument 
Status, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/us/bears-ears-ryan-
zinke.html?_r=0. Cf. Squillace et al., supra note 7, at 71, with JOHN YOO & TODD GAZIANO, AM. 
ENTERPRISE INST., PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO REVOKE OR REDUCE NATIONAL MONUMENT 
DESIGNATIONS 1 (2017), https://www.nationalparkstraveler.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
presidential-authority-to-revoke-or-reduce-national-monument-designations.pdf.  
 23.  See Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 
189 (1938). 
      24.     See Dep’t. of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, 2019–2024 National 
Outer Continental Shelf Oil & Gas Leasing: Draft Proposed Program (January 2018).  
 25.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, League of Conservation Voters v. 
Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101-SLG (D. Alaska May 3, 2017). Certain pre-lease activities, however, may be 
permitted if the withdrawal revocation stands. For the allegations related to pre-lease seismic testing, see 
id. at 33 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1340(a), (b), (g) (2012) and 30 C.F.R. pts. 550–551 (2017)). 
44.4 ANDERSON V3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/18  1:00 PM 
734 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 44:727 
I.  FEDERAL POWER OVER PUBLIC LANDS – A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Before European colonization of what is now the United States, 
indigenous peoples owned and occupied their territory, and governed relations 
among themselves according to their own laws. The rights of indigenous 
peoples in the United States have also received a measure of protection in the 
form of Indian reservations, and other reserved rights outside of actual 
reservations. In addition, other general statutes have been used to protect 
aspects of aboriginal use and occupancy. This Part reviews federal power to 
deal with the rights of indigenous peoples, and to deal with public lands after 
acquisition from Indian tribes. 
The United States Constitution vests Congress with full jurisdiction over 
federal public lands: “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States . . . .”26 “Congress exercises the powers both of 
a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.”27 This claim of 
proprietary control and regulatory jurisdiction, however, was limited at the 
outset by the fact that most of what became the United States was already 
claimed and occupied by indigenous peoples. Before full congressional 
authority could be exercised for the benefit of non-Indian settlers, the question 
of Indian property rights had to be resolved.  
The rights of indigenous people to use and occupy their lands as property 
owners were variously described under international and U.S. law as aboriginal 
title, Indian title, or original Indian title.28 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, Chief Justice 
Marshall considered competing claims to land by two non-Indians.29 One had 
acquired title directly from the Indians, and the other had acquired title from the 
United States, which had acquired the land from the Indians by treaty.30 
Holding that only the national government had power to acquire Indian land, 
the Court declared that the tribes have a “legal as well as just claim to retain 
possession of [the lands]” they historically occupied.31 The right of the 
discovering nation, and the United States as successor, thus consisted of a 
technical legal title, plus the “right of pre-emption.”32 That is, the United States 
 
 26.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 27.  Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). 
 28.  See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 43–52 (1947) (explaining 
origins and meaning of Indian property rights under international and federal law).  
 29.  Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 571–72 (1823). 
 30.  Id. at 561–62.  
 31.  Id. at 574. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831), the Court declared that “[t]he 
Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore an unquestioned right to the lands 
they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government.” 
 32.  Johnson, 21 U.S. at 585. 
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asserted the exclusive right to acquire the full beneficial title to land used and 
occupied by the indigenous occupants.33 
Of course, the Indian nations had no such understanding—much less 
agreement—with the proposition that the United States, or any other country, 
could divest them of their rights to soil and their way of life without consent. 
Chief Justice Marshall was aware of the arrogance of the legal proposition: 
“However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an 
inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted 
in the first instance, and afterwards sustained . . . it becomes the law of the 
land, and cannot be questioned.”34 Thus, Supreme Court precedent buttressed 
the United States’ legal claim to title, and the framework for eventual 
extinguishment of aboriginal title was in place.35 This assertion of authority 
over the continental United States was also extended to the territorial sea by 
various measures.36 This began with a three-mile belt off the coasts in 1793, 
and expanded to include the Exclusive Economic Zone.37 
By the late nineteenth century, most Indian claims to land had been 
resolved through treaties and acts of Congress, although some claims persisted 
to the 1970s.38 Tribes retained substantial amounts of land and, in many cases, 
off-reservation rights to hunt fish and gather.39 There are still unsettled 
questions regarding aboriginal title to marine areas in the OCS off the coast of 
Alaska.40 The importance of these areas to Alaska Natives is illustrated in part 
by litigation over oil and gas leasing in Arctic waters.41 The areas have 
tremendous importance as a source of food. President Obama took steps to 
protect Native subsistence uses in the OCS off of Alaska as discussed in 
subpart IV.B. 
 
 33.  For an illuminating analysis of the case and its progeny, see generally LINDSAY G. 
ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLE OF THEIR LANDS (2005); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 999–1004 (2012). 
 34.  Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591. 
 35.  See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE 
FRONTIER 178 (2005) (surveying federal-Indian land transactions and underlying policies). 
 36.  See John E. Noyes, The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 91, 92–93 (Donald Rothwell et al. eds., 2015).  
 37.  16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012); Hickey, Jr., supra note 9, at 2, 11.  
 38.  See Robert T. Anderson, Sovereignty and Subsistence: Native Self-Government and Rights to 
Hunt, Fish, and Gather after ANCSA, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 187, 189–211 (2016). Aboriginal claims in 
Alaska were not settled until 1971 in the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 
Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)).  
 39.  See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 207 (1999); 
Washington v. Wash. State Pass. Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1979). 
 40.  See People of the Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (avoiding 
a determination of Alaska Native aboriginals’ subsistence rights in the OCS and merely holding that 
those rights were not extinguished by Congress in ANCSA); Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 
619, 623 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (finding that the Native tribes used and occupied the Outer 
Continental Shelf of Alaska but rejecting the existence of aboriginal title based on lack of exclusive 
use); see generally Jordan Diamond et al., Rights and Roles: Alaska Natives and Ocean and Coastal 
Subsistence Resources, 8 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 219 (2013).  
 41.  See People of the Village of Gambell, 869 F.2d at 1280. 
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As it purchased or otherwise extinguished tribal aboriginal title,42 the 
federal government obtained full title to what became known as the public 
domain.43 In keeping with notions of manifest destiny and in order to 
encourage settlement and economic exploitation of western lands, the federal 
government divested itself of title to much of the public domain through a 
variety of means.44 The divestment process included railroad grants, 
homesteading laws, and grants of land directly to states as they were admitted 
to the Union.45 But as the United States retained increasing amounts of land in 
federal ownership, questions abounded as to the scope of federal power over 
such land—or whether the federal government could even retain land. Thus, a 
lessee of land used for mining purposes challenged federal authority to lease 
land on the theory that the Constitution only provided the federal government 
with authority to sell lands it acquired within the boundaries of a state.46 The 
Supreme Court answered that federal power over its land was complete and that 
Congress had the authority to transfer ownership of federal land in fee simple, 
or to retain the fee and merely lease the land for mining purposes as prescribed 
by Congress.47 As time passed, the Court rebuffed other challenges to federal 
power, including authority to condemn private land for use as a national 
historical park,48 and to withdraw land within a state for a federal forest 
reserve.49 The power over the public lands includes the authority to delegate 
regulatory power to an agency to adopt preemptive regulations on such lands,50 
to regulate activity off of such lands in order to ensure access,51 and to protect 
the purposes for which such lands are set aside or to preserve other federal 
interests.52 The next Part discusses how this power crept out to marine areas. 
 
 42.  See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 374–84 (1980) (recounting the events 
leading up to the unconstitutional taking of the Black Hills from the Great Sioux Nation). 
 43.  See generally GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, 1 PUB. NAT. 
RESOURCES L. § 1:9 (2d ed. 2016). 
 44.  See Getches, supra note 5, at 281–82; John D. Leshy, A Property Clause for the Twenty-First 
Century, 75 COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2004). 
 45.  See WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 18–27; see generally COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 
43, at § 1:14 (“Traditional ‘public land laws’ were the statutes ‘governing the alienation of public land,’ 
according to the Supreme Court in 1965.”). 
 46.  See United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. 526, 531 (1840).  
 47.  Id. at 538.  
 48.  See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 681–83 (1896). 
 49.  See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911). 
 50.  See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 520–21 (1911). 
 51.  See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897) (affirming the power to ensure 
access). 
 52.  See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (regarding the power to protect wild 
horses and burros); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927). For a current battle over the 
scope of federal authority over public lands see Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 U.S. 1061, 1072 (2016). 
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II. UNITED STATES JURISDICTION OVER INLAND WATERS AND THE OCS 
In the mid-twentieth century, a sharp dispute developed between the states 
and the federal government over ownership and control of marine waters 
adjacent to state coastlines.53 The controversy centered primarily over resource 
development issues, with little notice of conservation needs.54 President 
Truman declared that the United States owned and controlled marine waters, 
while the states claimed to own submerged marine waters out to three miles 
from the coast.55 This Part explains the nature of federal and state interests in 
navigable waters, the OCS, and resolution of these claims by Congress. 
The bounds of federal and state jurisdiction over waters are set by 
Congress, acting under the Commerce Clause56 and the Property Clause.57 
States have long been recognized to possess important interests in submerged 
lands under inland navigable waterways:58 “In order to allow new States to 
enter the Union on an ‘equal footing’ with the original States . . . , ‘the United 
States early adopted and constantly has adhered to the policy of regarding lands 
under navigable waters in acquired territory . . . as held for the ultimate benefit 
of future States.’”59 Moreover, in the Desert Land Act60 and other nineteenth 
century statutes, Congress made state law generally applicable to the use of 
waters on unreserved federal lands.61 While the federal government has 
deferred to state regulation of navigable waters for many purposes,62 that state 
authority is subject to preemptive federal power.63 The United States may 
 
 53.  See Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Frontier, 6 
STAN. L. REV. 23, 40–41 (1953). 
 54.  Id. at 23. 
 55.  See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.  
 56.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 57.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 58.   See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 US. 576, 591 (2012) (“Upon statehood, the State gains 
title within its borders to the beds of waters then navigable.”); Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 
230 (1845). Congress does have the authority to reserve the submerged lands in federal or Indian 
ownership. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 273 (2001) (“We ask whether Congress intended 
to include land under navigable waters within the federal reservation and, if so, whether Congress 
intended to defeat the future State’s title to the submerged lands.”). 
 59.  Idaho, 533 U.S. at 272 (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)). 
 60.  Act for Sale of Desert Land, ch. 107, § 1, 19 Stat. 377, 377 (1877).  
 61.  See Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162–63 (1935). 
 62.  See id. 
 63.  See United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 226 (1956) (holding that federal 
navigational servitude can preempt any use rights granted by a State to a private party, so that 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment is not required for taking such interests); United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (“Ownership of a private stream wholly 
upon the lands of an individual is conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is 
capable of private ownership is inconceivable.”); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 
174 U.S. 690, 706–07 (1899) (stating that a state may not grant private rights that destroy the 
navigability of that water course in derogation of the interests of all the people of the United States); 
John D. Leshy, Water Rights for New Federal Land Conservation Programs: A Turn-of-the-Century 
Evaluation, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 271, 288 (2001); see also Federal “Non-Reserved” Water 
Rights, 6 Op. O.L.C. 328, 363 (1982) (discussing federal power to reserve water unassociated with a 
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reserve the submerged land under navigable waters for federal or Indian 
purposes, and it also may reserve the water itself for the same purposes.64 
These authorities dealt with inland waters. Whether the submerged land 
principles applied in coastal marine waters remained a matter of dispute until 
the mid-twentieth century. 
Federal jurisdiction and control over the OCS was premised on a 
proclamation and executive order issued by President Truman in 1945, which 
provided that the “natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the 
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the 
United States [are declared] as appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
jurisdiction and control.”65 President Truman’s action fixed the federal claim to 
coastal waters and associated resources for the United States and vested 
administrative jurisdiction within the Department of the Interior. It also 
preserved a dispute with the coastal states over ownership of the “continental 
shelf within or outside of the three-mile limit.”66 The coastal states claimed 
ownership of submerged lands under marine waters within three miles of the 
low water mark on the coastline.67 The Supreme Court ruled that the federal 
government, not the states, owned submerged lands in the marginal sea in a 
series of cases in the mid-twentieth century.68 The Court reasoned “that 
national interests [and] responsibilities, and therefore national rights are 
paramount in waters lying . . . seaward [of the low water mark] in the three-
mile belt.”69 
 
reservation of federal property); A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 9.6 
(2017) (“Federal jurisdiction over waters now extends to all activities subject to the full Commerce 
Clause.”). 
 64.  See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 594–601 (1963) (affirming Indian and federal 
reserved water rights for various reservations along the Colorado River); see also Idaho, 533 U.S. at 274 
n.5 (holding that the submerged lands had been reserved for the Coeur d’Alene Indian tribe, but not 
reaching the issue of whether “the Tribe retained aboriginal title to the submerged lands, which cannot 
be extinguished without explicit action by Congress”). 
 65.  Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed 
of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303, 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945); see also 
Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305, 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945); PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW 
COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 
187–95 (1970) (discussing the OCS and its relation to federal public land law). The entire OCS is 
estimated at 1.7 billion acres. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 9. 
 66.  Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. at 12,305. 
 67.  See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23 (1947) (involving California alleging “that 
the original thirteen states acquired from the Crown of England title to all lands within their boundaries 
under navigable waters, including a three-mile belt in adjacent seas”); see also Matthew H. Armsby et 
al., Role of the States, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY, supra note 9, at 75–76 (explaining 
the historical role of the states in ocean and coastal management).  
 68.  See United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 
707, 720 (1950); California, 332 U.S. at 40. The Court noted that “the idea of a definite three-mile belt 
in which an adjacent nation can, if it chooses, exercise broad, if not complete dominion, has apparently 
at last been generally accepted throughout the world, although as late as 1876 there was still 
considerable doubt in England about its scope and even its existence.” California, 332 U.S. at 33. 
 69.  California, 332 U.S. at 36. 
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Congress reversed the outcome by enacting the Submerged Lands Act 
(SLA), which confirmed state ownership of submerged lands and resources in 
the marginal sea to the states.70 The SLA established seaward boundaries of 
most states at three nautical miles from the coastline, and relinquished to the 
states title and most regulatory jurisdiction over the submerged lands and 
associated natural resources.71 In territorial waters (out to three miles), the 
United States generally defers to state jurisdiction and control under the SLA.72 
However, the SLA specifically provides that “nothing” in the statute “shall 
affect . . . the constitutional authority of the United States . . . to regulate . . . 
navigation.”73 As Justice Scalia explained in the context of marine waters in a 
national park in Alaska, state ownership of submerged lands under marine 
waters has little effect on federal authority to regulate activities in navigable 
waters—even within state boundaries. “If title to submerged lands passed to 
Alaska [under the equal footing doctrine], the Federal Government would still 
retain significant authority to regulate activities in the waters of Glacier Bay by 
virtue of its dominant navigational servitude, other aspects of the Commerce 
Clause, and even the treaty power.”74 All of these sources of power are also at 
play in the OCS—although without any general basis for competing state 
authority. 
Working its way through Congress at the same time as the SLA was 
OCSLA, in which Congress “assert[ed] the exclusive jurisdiction and control of 
the Federal Government of the United States over the seabed and subsoil of the 
outer Continental Shelf, . . . [in order to] provide for the development of its vast 
mineral resources.”75 It became law a little more than two months after the 
SLA.76 In OCSLA, Congress defined the term “outer Continental Shelf” as “all 
 
 70.  Pub. L. No. 83-31, § 3(a)–(b), 67 Stat. 29, 30 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 
1311(a), (b) (2012)). The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 was made applicable to the State of Alaska in 
its Statehood Act. Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958); see Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village 
of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 547 (1987). 
 71.  43 U.S.C. § 1311(a), (b); see Armsby et al., supra note 67, at 76–93 (describing a variety of 
state statutes and programs affecting marine waters). 
 72.  43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to 
and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and 
the natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer, 
lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law 
be, and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and 
assigned to the respective States . . . .”). 
 73.  Id. § 1311(d); see id. § 1314(a); Robin Kundis Craig, Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as 
Public Lands: a Historical Perspective, 34 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 69–70 (2013). 
 74.  Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 116–17 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). 
 75.  S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 2 (1953).  
 76.  OCSLA, Pub L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1342 (2012); see also S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 1; H.R. REP. NO. 83-1031, at 1 (1953) (Conf. Rep.) 
(describing OCSLA as an amendment to the Submerged Lands Act); Christopher, supra note 53, at 29–
31; PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 31–32 (1968) (describing the 
political circumstances leading to the passage of SLA and OCSLA about two months apart in 1953); 
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submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of [state] lands beneath 
navigable waters . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the 
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.”77 The OCS thus 
extends the seaward boundary of each coastal State, which is three miles 
beyond the state’s coastline.78 Forty-eight states have the three-mile boundary 
from the coastline, while Texas and Florida succeeded in establishing their 
seaward boundary at three leagues.79 
The primary purposes of OCSLA were to broadly assert jurisdiction over 
the OCS and to promote the development of mineral interests.80 The Secretary 
of the Interior was also empowered “to provide for the prevention of waste and 
conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf.”81 Section 
11 authorizes geological and geophysical exploration in the OCS provided that 
it is “not unduly harmful to aquatic life” in the area subject to exploration.82 
Section 12 delegated to the president broad authority to withdraw areas from 
 
Milo B. Mason & Paul B. Smyth, Offshore Mineral Development, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND 
POLICY, supra note 9, at 392–93. 
 77.  43 U.S.C. § 1331(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 83-1031, at 12 (“[J]urisdiction and control of the 
United States is extended to the seabed and subsoil of the entire outer Continental Shelf adjacent to the 
shores of the United States instead of merely to the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed as in the 
original House version . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 78.  43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2). The coastline is defined as “the line of ordinary low water.” Id. § 
1301(c).  
 79.  See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 83–84 (1960) (holding that Texas was entitled to a 
three-league boundary from the coastline); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121, 129 (1960) (holding 
that Florida’s three-league boundary extends only along the Gulf coast—not the Atlantic). According to 
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management:  
Texas and the Gulf coast of Florida [extend] 3 marine leagues (9 nautical miles) seaward 
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Louisiana 
extend[s] 3 U.S. nautical miles (U.S. nautical mile = 6080.2 feet) seaward of the baseline 
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. All other States’ seaward limits are 
extended 3 International Nautical Miles (International Nautical Miles = 6076.10333 feet) 
seaward of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
Outer Continental Shelf, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Leasing/Outer-Continental-Shelf/Index.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2017). 
 80.  See PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 65, at 187 (“Congress enacted [OCSLA] 
to provide a system to govern the issuance and maintenance of mineral leases on the Shelf.”); 
Christopher, supra note 53, at 23; Mason & Smyth, supra note 76, at 392. Congress did provide, 
however, that state law that does not conflict with federal law may be applied to the OCS. See 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(a)(2)(A). 
 81.  OCSLA § 5(a)(1). The “conservation of natural resources” mentioned in the statute includes 
actions to protect environmental values as well as matters related to efficient mineral production. See 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1973) (“[A] careful reading of the statutes leads 
us to the conclusion that Congress authorized the Secretary to suspend operations under existing leases 
whenever he determines that the risk to the marine environment outweighs the immediate national 
interest in exploring and drilling for oil and gas.”); see also Copper Valley Mach. Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 
653 F.2d 595, 600–01 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. for the proposition that the phrase 
“conservation of natural resources” as used in the Mineral Leasing Act includes environmental 
protection). 
 82.  OCSLA § 11(a). 
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leasing,83 purchase all minerals,84 suspend leases in times of war,85 and restrict 
mineral development in leased areas when necessary for national defense.86 
Major amendments in 1978 added more explicit and detailed environmental 
considerations to some aspects of mineral leasing in the OCS.87 Those 
amendments left intact the authority of the president to withdraw areas under 
OCSLA section 12(a)—authority exercised in the Eisenhower and Nixon 
Administrations.88 
The next Part examines the similar withdrawal provision in the Antiquities 
Act, before Part IV more closely examines OCSLA’s conservation and 
withdrawal authority. 
III.  CONSERVATION MEASURES UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 
As discussed above, Congress has broad power to designate federal public 
lands for conservation, development, or multiple-use purposes. It can also 
transfer lands to the states or to private parties as in the cases of statehood acts, 
railroad grants, or the homestead laws. This Part examines the history and 
application of another course Congress has followed, delegating authority to 
the president to withdraw lands for conservation and other purposes in the 
Antiquities Act. The Antiquities Act provides that “[t]he President may, in the 
President’s discretion, declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, 
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific 
interest that are situated on land owned or controlled by the Federal 
Government to be national monuments.”89 “The limits of the parcels shall be 
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management 
 
 83.  Id. § 12(a). 
 84.  Id. § 12(b). 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. § 12(d). 
 87.  See Gordon L. James, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978: 
Balancing Energy Needs with Environmental Concerns?, 40 LA. L. REV 177, 178 (1979); Robert B. 
Krueger & Louis H. Singer, An Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 
19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909, 921 (1979). Congress provided that one purpose of the statute is to 
“preserve, protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf in a manner 
which is consistent with the need . . . (B) to balance orderly energy resource development with 
protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments . . . .” Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–372, § 102, 92 Stat. 629, 631 (codified in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.). In addition, Congress required that “[m]anagement of the outer Continental Shelf 
shall be conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental values of the 
renewable and nonrenewable resources contained in the outer Continental Shelf, and the potential 
impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values of the outer Continental Shelf and the marine, 
costal, and human environments.” Id. § 208, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1).  
 88.  See Establishment of Santa Barbara Channel Ecological Preserve, 34 Fed. Reg. 5655 (Mar. 
26, 1969); Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve, Proclamation No. 3339, 25 Fed. Reg. 2352 (Mar. 15, 1960). 
 89.  54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (Supp. 2017). For a comprehensive review of the Antiquities Act, see 
generally Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473 
(2003). 
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of the objects to be protected.”90 The Antiquities Act applies to federally 
owned uplands as well as to marine areas within the OCS because they are 
“owned or controlled” by the United States.91 
The statute delegates broad authority to the president to designate 
monuments. Moreover, courts have rejected every challenge to monument 
designations. However, the Act does not also delegate to the president authority 
to revoke monument designations. No monument has ever been abolished by 
presidential action; no president has even attempted to abolish a national 
monument.92 As discussed below, while there is no case law dealing with 
presidential revocation or modification, the plain language of the statute 
supports the argument that only Congress may revoke a monument. 
Furthermore, a long-standing administrative interpretation by the attorney 
general holds that the president’s delegated authority does not include the 
power to revoke monument designations. As explained in Part IV, a similarly 
limited delegation of authority is provided in OCSLA section 12(a). 
A. National Monument Designations 
The legislative history of the Antiquities Act reveals that while the initial 
concern that brought the issue to the attention of Congress was the looting and 
exploitation of Native American archeological sites, the statute’s final text 
included much broader coverage.93 The American Association of the 
Advancement of Science and the Department of the Interior sponsored the first 
bill introduced by Congress.94 Other bills, more narrowly drafted, would have 
simply prohibited and criminalized the act of harming an “aboriginal antiquity” 
on federal land,95 or authorized land reservations of up to 320 acres to protect 
 
 90.  54 U.S.C. § 320301(b). As originally enacted, the Act stated: 
The President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public 
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of 
historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof 
parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area 
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.  
Act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, § 2, 34 Stat. 225, 225. The statute was recodified in 2014. Act of Dec. 19, 
2014, Pub. L. No. 113-287, § 3, 128 Stat. 3094, 3259 (codified at 54 §§ 100101–320303).  
 91.  See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text; 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (Supp. 2017). Cf. 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 548 n.15 (1987) (“The United States may not 
hold ‘title’ to the submerged lands of the OCS, but we hesitate to conclude that the United States does 
not have ‘title’ to any ‘interests therein.’”). 
 92.  ALEXANDRA M. WYATT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44687, ANTIQUITIES ACT: SCOPE OF 
AUTHORITY FOR MODIFICATION OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS 3 (2016). 
 93.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 478; see RONALD F. LEE, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906, at 47 
(1970) (describing the initial efforts of the Antiquities Act to promote aboriginal antiquities situated on 
federal lands). 
 94.  H.R. 8066, 56th Cong. (1900); see sources cited supra note 93. 
 95.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 479 (citing H.R. 8195, 56th Cong. (1900)); see generally LEE, 
supra note 93, at 51. 
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ancient ruins.96 Department of the Interior officials were heavily involved in 
the debate and advanced a proposal to expand the authority of the president to 
set aside lands for more expansive purposes than simply protecting artifacts and 
architectural sites.97 The bill that ultimately became the Antiquities Act 
dropped the 320-acre limitation, and included authority to protect not only 
archeological sites, but also “objects of historic or scientific interest.”98 Thus, 
the history and language of the Act support an interpretation that Congress 
delegated to the president broad power to designate monuments. 
Such an interpretation is buttressed by the early, expansive, and 
undisturbed use of the Antiquities Act’s designation authority by presidents and 
the fact that courts—including the Supreme Court—have rejected every 
challenge to a monument designation. Some have argued that geographically 
broad designations are not permitted, or that a president has unbridled authority 
to revoke monuments.99 As shown below, these arguments are not supported 
by the text or history of the Act’s application. Instead, every court to consider a 
monument designation has upheld the action as within the authority delegated 
by Congress. Moreover, when Congress has disapproved of a particular 
monument, it has explicitly revoked the monument designation, but left 
untouched presidential authority to establish monuments.100 
The first challenge to a monument designation under the Antiquities Act, 
the 1920 case Cameron v. United States, involved a miner/entrepreneur who 
claimed a right of possession to portions of the South Rim of the Grand 
Canyon, including the Bright Angel Trail,101 under the General Mining Law of 
1872.102 The miner alleged that President Theodore Roosevelt’s Proclamation 
of the Grand Canyon National Monument was invalid. The Supreme Court 
upheld the Proclamation: 
The defendants insist that the monument reserve should be disregarded on 
the ground that there was no authority for its creation. To this we cannot 
assent. The act under which the president proceeded empowered him to 
establish reserves embracing “objects of historic or scientific interest.” The 
Grand Canyon, as stated in his proclamation, “is an object of unusual 
scientific interest.” It is the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if 
not in the world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among 
explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is 
 
 96.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 479 (citing H.R. 9245, 56th Cong. (1900)). 
 97.  Id. at 479–80 (citing H.R. 11021, 56th Cong. (1900)); see LEE, supra note 93, at 52–55. 
 98.  54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (Supp. 2017). 
 99.  See generally YOO & GAZIANO, supra note 22.  
 100.  See NAME REDACTED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL MONUMENTS and the 
ANTIQUITIES ACT 3 n.17 (2017) (citing abolishment of Fossil Cyad National Monument and Papago 
Saguaro National Monument in 1956 and 1930, respectively). 
 101.  Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 454–55 (1920); see also JOHN D. LESHY, THE 
MINING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 57–60 (1987) (discussing Cameron’s claims against the 
federal government); Getches, supra note 5, at 303–05.  
 102.  General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17. Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22–
42 (2012)). 
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regarded as one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its 
borders thousands of visitors.103 
There was no specific discussion by the Court of whether the monument 
was “confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and 
management of the objects to be protected.”104 However, one can surmise from 
the quoted text that the Court believed the standard was quite easily met. 
The Supreme Court also considered the scope of the Antiquities Act in 
Cappaert v. United States, which involved a monument designated to protect a 
rare species of desert fish and the pool they inhabited.105 The challengers—
nearby ranchers enjoined by the federal government from engaging in 
groundwater pumping that lowered the water level in the pool and threatened 
the fish106—argued that the monument was invalid because the Act authorized 
the president to reserve federal lands as monuments only to protect 
archeological sites.107 The Court rejected the argument, ruling that the Act 
authorized the president to proclaim the pool as a national monument because 
the pool and its fish were “objects of historic or scientific interest.”108 
In another case, United States v. California,109 the Court considered 
whether a proclamation establishing the Channel Islands National 
Monument110 included submerged lands. The Court upheld the monument 
designation, but because Congress had transferred ownership of the submerged 
lands out to the three-mile limit to the states,111 the Court did not need to reach 
the question of presidential intent to include the submerged lands in the 
monument.112 The case illustrates the initial use of the Antiquities Act to 
protect marine waters and associated resources.113 
 
 103.  Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56. 
 104.  See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b). 
 105.  Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
 106.  Id. at 133. 
 107.  Id. at 141–42. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  United States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978). 
 110.  Proclamation No. 2281, 52 Stat. 1541 (Apr. 26, 1938). 
 111.  California, 436 U.S. at 40–42. The transfer was accomplished in the Submerged Lands Act. 
See supra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 112.  California, 436 U.S. at 40–42.  
 113.  Other marine monuments have been created within United States waters in the OCS. See 
Buck Island Reef National Monument, Proclamation No. 3443 (Dec. 28, 1961) (U.S. Virgin Islands); 
California Coastal National Monument, Proclamation No. 7264, 65 Fed. Reg. 2821 (Jan. 11, 2000); 
Virgin Islands Coral Reef National Monument, Proclamation No. 7399, 66 Fed. Reg. 7364 (Jan 17, 
2001); Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument, Proclamation. No. 8031, 71 Fed. Reg. 36,443 
(June 15, 2006) (originally named Northwestern Hawaiian Marine National Monument); WW II Valor 
in the Pacific National Monument, Proclamation. No. 8327, 73 Fed. Reg 75,293 (Dec. 5, 2008); 
Marianas Trench Marine National Monument, Proclamation No. 8335, 74 Fed. Reg. 1557 (Jan. 6, 2009); 
Pacific Remote Islands Marine National Monument, Proclamation No. 8336, 74 Fed. Reg. 1565 (Jan. 6, 
2009); Rose Atoll Marine National Monument), Proclamation No. 8337, 74 Fed. Reg. 1577 (Jan. 6, 
2009); Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine Monument, Proclamation No. 9496, 81 Fed. Reg. 
65,161 (Sept. 15, 2016). 
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President Clinton exercised authority under the Antiquities Act with great 
vigor. He “proclaimed twenty-two new or expanded national monuments, 
thereby adding approximately six million acres to the national monument 
system.”114 In 2002, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected a sweeping challenge 
to six monuments proclaimed by President Clinton.115 The court of appeals 
rejected the argument that the president did not have power to create 
monuments under the authority granted by the Antiquities Act. The court first 
noted that “[i]n reviewing challenges under the Antiquities Act, the Supreme 
Court has indicated generally that review is available to ensure that the 
Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and that the 
president has not exceeded his statutory authority.”116 Moving on to discuss the 
president’s actions, the court observed that “[e]ach Proclamation identifies 
particular objects or sites of historic or scientific interest and recites grounds for 
the designation that comport with the Act’s policies and requirements.”117 The 
court accepted the statements in the proclamation at face value because the 
challengers had not alleged any facts to the contrary in their complaint.118 
In Tulare County v. Bush, a case decided the same day as Mountain States 
Legal Foundation, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to the 
establishment of Grand Sequoia National Monument.119 Tulare County owned 
land within and near the Monument and claimed that the Proclamation violated 
the Antiquities Act because it failed to adequately identify the objects to be 
protected and, among other things, was too large.120 As in Mountain States 
Legal Foundation, the court rejected all the arguments. First, the court stated 
that “[b]y identifying historic sites and objects of scientific interest located 
within the designated lands, the Proclamation adverts to the statutory 
standard.”121 Second, the court found that including “such items as ecosystems 
and scenic vistas in the Proclamation did not contravene the terms of the statute 
by relying on nonqualifying features.”122 Third, the court found that the size of 
the monument was appropriate, noting that the “claim that the Proclamation 
covered too much land is dependent on the proposition that parts of the 
Monument lack scientific or historical value, an issue on which Tulare County 
made no factual allegations.”123 Finally, the court rejected the claim that 
 
 114.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 474. 
 115.  Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id. at 1137. 
 118.  See id.  
 119.  Tulare County v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 120.  Id. at 1140–41.   
 121.  Id. at 1141. 
 122.  Id. at 1142. 
 123.  Id.  
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Congress had unconstitutionally delegated authority to the president due to 
inadequate standards for making the withdrawals.124 
B.  Congress Did Not Delegate Power to Revoke a Monument 
Although the language of the Antiquities Act authorizes the president to 
designate monuments, it is silent regarding revocation or modification.125 
While there is no judicial precedent respecting presidential authority to revoke 
a monument,126 the Supreme Court recently reminded us that “it is never our 
job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory text under the banner of 
speculation about what Congress might have done had it faced a question 
that . . . it never faced.”127 No court has considered whether Congress intended 
to grant presidential authority to revoke a monument absent an express 
declaration, because no president has ever attempted to revoke a monument.128 
It has been argued that the delegated power to establish national 
monuments also includes the implied power to revoke them.129 Reading a 
statute as including a delegation of power not provided by Congress requires 
adding something to the law, and should not be done without compelling 
reasons provided by legislative history or the circumstances of Congress’s 
action. Here, there is no legislative history supporting that argument, and the 
circumstances surrounding the passage indicate that when Congress wished to 
delegate such authority, it did so expressly. There were two contemporaneous 
statutes authorizing the use of executive authority to revoke prior executive 
withdrawals.130 First, with respect to forests, Congress provided that  
[t]he President is hereby authorized . . . to modify any Executive order that 
has been or may hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, and by 
such modification may reduce the area or change the boundary lines of 
such reserve, or may vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.131  
Second, the Pickett Act of 1910 authorized the president to temporarily 
withdraw public lands for various purposes with “such withdrawals . . . [to] 
remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress.”132 In each 
case, the authorization of withdrawal authority was accompanied by an express 
 
 124.  Id. at 1143 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136–37 (D.C. Cir. 
2002)).  
 125.  See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (Supp. 2017). 
 126.  See WYATT, supra note 92, at 1.  
 127.  Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017).  
 128.  See WYATT, supra note 92, at 3.  
 129.  YOO & GAZIANO, supra note 22, at 1–2. 
 130.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 553. 
 131.  Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 36, repealed in part by National Forest Management 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 9, 90 Stat. 2949, 2957 (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a) (2012) 
(emphasis added)). 
 132.  Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847, 847 (1910), repealed by Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (emphasis added); see 
Getches, supra note 5, at 292–93 (discussing the Pickett Act).  
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congressional grant of power to the Executive to revoke or modify the reserved 
or withdrawn area. The implication of the practice is that at least in the case of 
turn-of-the-century public lands statutes, presidential power to reserve an area 
is a one-way street unless accompanied by a corresponding grant of revocation 
power.133 
The question of presidential authority to revoke a monument was 
addressed in a 1938 attorney general’s opinion. Attorney General Homer 
Cummings was asked to comment on the recommendation from the acting 
secretary of the interior that the president revoke the 3.4-acre Castle Pinckney 
National Monument established by President Coolidge in 1924.134 Castle 
Pinckney was the site of the first takeover of Union property by the 
Confederacy in the Civil War, but it apparently lacked significant political 
support.135 Cummings noted, “My predecessors have held that if public lands 
are reserved by the president for a particular purpose under express authority of 
an act of Congress, the president is thereafter without authority to abolish such 
reservation.”136 The attorney general in 1862 considered an effort to revoke the 
Rock Island military reservation and reasoned that “the Executive can no more 
destroy his own authorized work, without some other legislative sanction, than 
any other person can.”137 This reasoning supported Cummings’ conclusion that 
the president does not have “the power to abolish a monument entirely.”138 
The latter portion of the attorney general opinion alludes to the power to 
diminish monuments based on findings that an original designation was not the 
“smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects 
to be protected” as required by the statute. Although subsequent presidents 
diminished at least sixteen monuments in size,139 persuasive scholarship140 
 
 133.  See Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 975 (2003). 
Because the President’s successor cannot unilaterally revoke such [national monument] 
designations, this action seems to be a good candidate for a President who wants to extend 
his influence beyond his term in office. A President’s policy in favor of designating national 
monuments is likely to bear fruit well beyond that President’s term. Subsequent 
administrations could neglect national monuments, the same as they can subvert the 
effectiveness of midnight regulations by failing to enforce them vigorously. However, the 
designation is there to stay and, in most instances, it is likely to be honored, even by 
administrations with less enthusiasm for the designation. 
Id. 
 134.  Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 185–86 
(1938). 
 135.  Id. at 186. 
 136.  Id. at 186–87 (citing Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 359, 364 (1862)). 
 137.  Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. at 364.  
 138.  Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. at 188. The 
Monument designation was eventually extinguished by Congress, and the property was transferred to the 
State of South Carolina. Act of Mar. 29, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-447, 70 Stat. 61. 
 139.  See https://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm. Two were 
diminished by granting rights of way and the other changes varied in size from 40 acres to 313,000 
acres. See also Squillace, supra note 89, at 585 (Appendix). See also NAME REDACTED, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL MONUMENTS and the ANTIQUITIES ACT 15, tbl.B-2 (2017) 
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also supports the argument that Congress’s express grant of withdrawal 
authority does not include implied revocation authority.141 The same reasoning 
supports the argument that presidential boundary alterations to date are of 
dubious validity.142 Professor Mark Squillace argues that a monument may 
neither be revoked nor diminished after being proclaimed by a president.143 He 
argues that by definition, a monument proclamation contains the “smallest area 
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be 
protected.”144 Thus, to allow a new president to “reverse the considered 
judgment of a prior President is not simply correcting a mistake” but allows the 
new president to exercise a power not granted by the Antiquities Act.145 
Instead, only Congress has the authority to revoke or diminish a monument 
pursuant to its plenary authority under the Property Clause of the 
Constitution.146 
The fact that no president has ever purported to revoke a national 
monument in over one hundred years indicates that such power is not necessary 
for the use and well-being of the nation’s public lands. Moreover, the fact that 
Congress retains and exercises plenary power to adjust designations and uses of 
public lands counsels in favor of interpreting the statute consistently with its 
literal terms—a limited Executive power to withdraw lands, but not to revoke 
or modify prior designations.147 Congress revised the general public lands laws 
in the Federal Land and Policy Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976, when it 
limited some executive authority to make withdrawals and revoke them.148 
Although Congress repealed the Pickett Act and reversed the “implied 
withdrawal authority” recognized in the Midwest Oil case,149 it did not revise 
the withdrawal authority provided in the Antiquities Act. Instead, FLPMA 
provides that no modification or revocation of a withdrawal may be made 
except as provided by Congress.150 
No monument designation has been set aside by a court, and the 
arguments discussed above demonstrate that the president lacks authority to 
 
(asserting that eighteen monuments were either diminished, or enlarged and diminished by various 
presidents). 
 140.  See generally id. 
 141.  Id. at 554–66 
 142.  Id. at 566–68. 
 143.  Squillace, supra note 89, at 554–68. 
 144.  Id. at 555. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 147.  See John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 
(2014) (“In particular, the Court’s new textualism permits interpreters to read statutes reasonably and 
purposively—to engage in Legal Process–style reasoning—within the margins of discretion left by the 
statutory text.”). 
 148.  Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 102(a)(4), 90 Stat. 2743, 2743 (1976) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 
1701(a)(4) (2012)). 
 149.  Id. § 704(a).  
 150.  Id. § 102(a)(4). 
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revoke a monument designation. As discussed below, the withdrawal authority 
delegated to the president under OCSLA section 12(a) is a similar grant of 
reservation authority that does not include the grant of power to future 
presidents to revoke the prior action. Instead, that authority is reserved to 
Congress. The marine monuments stand on the same legal footing as all others, 
and likewise may be altered or revoked only by Congress. 
IV. CONSERVATION AUTHORITY UNDER OCSLA 
OCSLA’s text and the history of its administration provide context for 
President Obama’s actions and demonstrate that his five withdrawals of areas 
from mineral leasing may not be revoked or modified by a subsequent 
president. As a matter of policy, withdrawal by the president preserves 
Congress’s “prerogative and flexibility” to authorize mineral leasing in the 
future, while preserving resources determined to be important enough to justify 
a presidential withdrawal.151 Such a result strikes an appropriate balance 
between Congress’s plenary power over public lands, and the historic role of 
the president in reserving land from certain uses. It also allows presidents to set 
particularly important areas aside from the possibility of any leasing, while 
allowing the secretary of the interior to carry out the offshore leasing program 
in the remainder of the OCS. In addition, in FLPMA, Congress indicated 
approval of prior OCSLA withdrawals, and precluded their revocation without 
explicit congressional authorization. 
A. OCSLA Delegated Leasing Authority to the Secretary of the Interior, and 
 Included Presidential Power to Withdraw Areas for Conservation 
Purposes 
The substance of OCSLA was originally considered with the SLA, but 
passed as separate legislation in August of 1953, just two months after the 
SLA.152 As discussed in Part II, OCSLA asserted the federal government’s 
exclusive jurisdiction and control over the seabed, subsoil, and natural 
resources of the OCS, to provide for the development of its vast mineral 
resources.153 Mineral leases were authorized to provide access to “oil, gas, or 
 
 151.  See Getches, supra note 5, at 287; see also United States ex rel. McLennon v. Wilbur, 283 
U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (power to lease land under the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act does not require any 
leasing at all). 
 152.  OCSLA, Pub L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1342 (2012); see also S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 1 (1953); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1031, at 1 (1953) (Conf. Rep.) 
(describing OCSLA as an amendment to the Submerged Lands Act); GATES, supra note 76, at 31–32 
(describing the political circumstances leading to the passage of SLA and OCSLA about two months 
apart in 1953); Christopher, supra note 53, at 29–31 (describing the legislative history of OCSLA). 
Given the short period between the two, the legislative history and provisions of the SLA are relevant to 
the proper interpretation of OCSLA. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 153.  See 43 U.S. § 1333(a)(1); OCSLA § 4; S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 2; Mason & Smyth, supra note 
76, at 392–93. 
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other minerals.”154 Federal jurisdiction extended to the OCS “as if the outer 
Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within 
a State.”155 State laws could apply so long as they did not interfere with the text 
or objectives of federal law.156 OCSLA did not specify the nature of all the 
rights to explore, develop, or produce that were transferred to the purchaser of a 
lease, instead leaving it to the Department of the Interior to define the scope of 
such rights at the time a lease sale was announced.157 
OCLSA provides for leasing “at the discretion of the Secretary [of the 
Interior]”158 for terms of up to five years, or so long as oil and gas are produced 
in paying quantities.159 When passed in 1953, OCSLA provided no detailed 
provisions dealing with environmental protection, but it did allow the secretary 
of the interior to provide by regulation for “the prevention of waste and 
conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf.”160 Of 
course, whether to lease any particular area was within the discretion of the 
secretary of the interior, and that alone would provide some temporary 
protection from development-related harms.161 In addition, Congress’s grant of 
authority to promulgate regulations included the general power to protect 
environmental values.162 In the only decision considering the secretary’s power 
to take actions suspending leases in aid of environmental protection, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that “the Act speaks of ‘conservation of the natural resources of 
the outer Continental Shelf,’ not just of conservation of oil, gas, sulphur and 
other mineral resources.”163 
 
 154.  OCSLA § 2(c) (defining the term “mineral lease”). 
 155.  Id. § 4(a)(1). As such, the OCS is an area “owned or controlled by the government within the 
meaning of the Antiquities Act.” 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (Supp. 2017). 
 156.  OCSLA § 4(a)(2).   
 157.  Id. § 5; see Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 336 (1984). Section 6 of the 
statute provided for the transition from state leases in the OCS that were issued prior to OCSLA. 
OCSLA § 6. This statutory scheme demonstrates sufficient federal government control over the OCS to 
bring the area within the text of the Antiquities Act. See supra note 9.  
 158.  OCSLA § 8(a). 
 159.  Id. § 8(b). This section also required that leases not exceed 5760 acres, and that the federal 
government receive a royalty of not less than 12.5 percent. Id. 
 160.  Id. § 5(a)(1).  
 161.  See Christopher, supra note 53, at 44–45, n.108. Section 11 of the statute authorized any 
federal agency, or private party authorized by the Secretary, to carry our geologic and geophysical 
explorations “which are not unduly harmful to aquatic life in such area.” OCSLA § 11.  
 162.  Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The Secretary is 
responsible for conserving marine life, recreational potential, and aesthetic values, as well as the 
reserves of gas and oil.”). 
 163.  Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1973). In so doing, the court carefully 
examined the legislative history of the phrase “natural resources.” Id. Because the term was drawn from 
and defined in the Submerged Lands Act, the court ascribed the same meaning to it in OCSLA. Id. at 
145–46 (“The OCS Act was originally introduced in Congress as Title III of the Submerged Lands Act, 
67 Stat. 29, May 22, 1953. See 1953 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2177 ff, quoting S. Rep. 411, H. 
Rep. 413, Conf. Rep. 1031, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). It was stricken from that Act, but reintroduced 
in the same form and ultimately adopted on August 7, 1953. In the legislative history, it is still referred 
to as Title III of the Submerged Lands Act, although it was finally adopted as an amendment to the 
Submerged Lands Act. It is clear, however, that the two Acts are in pari materia. . . . We think it entirely 
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Major amendments to OCSLA in 1978 added explicit environmental 
protections to the leasing process.164 The revisions set out four distinct stages 
that could lead to the production of oil and gas in the OCS, and added 
environmental provisions in keeping with the modernization of environmental 
law.165 First, the Department of the Interior must formulate a five-year leasing 
plan for the entire OCS.166 Second, lease sales occur under a competitive 
bidding process.167 Third, successful lessees submit an exploration plan and are 
permitted to explore for oil and gas, but subject to secretarial discretion.168 
Exploration may proceed only if the lessees’ exploration plan “will not be 
unduly harmful to aquatic life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous 
or unsafe conditions, unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or 
disturb any site, structure, or object of historical or archeological 
significance.”169 The fourth stage is also discretionary, and consists of 
development and production on the leases.170 Challenges to leasing decisions 
may occur at any stage of the proceedings, and often do.171 In addition, the 
1978 amendments added detailed environmental protections to OCSLA.172 For 
 
reasonable for the Secretary to conclude that the OCS Act, in § 5(a)(1), uses the phrase ‘natural 
resources’ in the sense in which it is defined in Section 2(e) of the Submerged Lands Act.”). See also 
Copper Valley Mach. Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 600–01 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Gulf Oil 
Corp. for the proposition that the phrase “conservation of natural resources” as used in the Mineral 
Leasing Act included environmental protection). 
 164.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 102, 92 Stat. 
629, 631 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1802 (2012)) (stating the purpose is to develop oil and natural gas 
resources in the OCS “in a manner which is consistent with the need (A) to make such resources 
available to meet the Nation’s energy needs as rapidly as possible, (B) to balance orderly energy 
resource development with protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments”); see Krueger & 
Singer, supra note 87, at 921. 
 165.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 § 208 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 
1344); Edward A. Fitzgerald, Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel: The Evolution of Interior’s 
Five Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 12 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 5 
(1994) (describing evolution of offshore leasing programs); Mason & Smyth, supra note 76, at 396 
(describing how “OCSLA intends a careful and detailed analysis at least every five years” to weigh the 
benefits and risks of development in the nation’s OCS areas).  
 166.  43 U.S.C. § 1344. Except, of course, for those areas withdrawn from leasing by statute or 
presidential directive. 
 167.  Id. § 1337(a). States and local governments have rights to notice and participation “regarding 
the size, timing, or location of a proposed lease sale or with respect to a proposed development and 
production plan.” Id. § 1345.  
 168.  Id. § 1340(c)(1). 
 169.  Id. § 1340(g)(3).  
 170.  See id. § 1351(h); Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337–42 (1984); see also 
Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 610 (2000). 
   171.   See, e.g., Ctr. for Sustainable Economy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 599–600 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(dismissing NEPA challenge to national leasing program on ripeness grounds, but reaching other 
issues); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 472 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(dismissing NEPA and ESA claims on ripeness grounds, but reaching OCSLA-based challenges).  
 172.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 102(2)–(3), 
92 Stat. 629, 631 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1802) (stating that the purposes of the Act are to “preserve, 
protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf in a manner which is 
consistent with the need (A) to make such resources available to meet the Nation’s energy needs as 
rapidly as possible, (B) to balance orderly energy resource development with protection of the human, 
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example, exploration activity under an OCS lease may not occur if the 
secretary of the interior finds that the activity “would probably cause serious 
harm or damage to life (including fish and other aquatic life), to property, to 
any mineral . . . , to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or 
human environment.”173 Despite these protective changes, the program’s 
implementation has been sharply criticized.174 
Unchanged from the original 1953 enactment is section 12(a), which 
provides simply: “The President of the United States may, from time to time, 
withdraw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental 
Shelf.”175 Section 12(a) was added by the Congressional Conference 
Committee176 to supplement withdrawal authority delegated to the president for 
defense and other national security concerns.177 Before the amendment, the 
section was captioned “National Emergency Reservations” and provided, “[t]he 
 
marine, and coastal environments, (C) to insure the public a fair and equitable return on the resources of 
the Outer Continental Shelf, and (D) to preserve and maintain free enterprise competition”). The federal 
government’s environmental record in implementing the statute has been criticized. See Michael LeVine 
et al., What About BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas 
Planning and Leasing, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 231, 258 (2014) (“The 1978 amendments to OCSLA were 
intended to ensure an appropriate balance between the pursuit of hydrocarbon resources in federal 
waters and the protection of the marine environment. All too often, however, DOI has fallen short of this 
objective.”); see also William M. Cohen & Jack Haugrud, Environmental Considerations in Outer-
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing in the United States, 3 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1990). 
 173.  43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (quoted in Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 604, 609 (2000)). 
 174.  See Andrew Hartsig et al., Next Steps to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and 
Gas Planning and Leasing, 33 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“suggesting potential improvements to the 
regulations that govern three of BOEM’s substantive obligations: (1) development of five-year OCS oil 
and gas leasing programs; (2) sale of OCS leases to oil and gas companies; and (3) review of OCS 
exploration drilling plans”). Even after the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, such efforts fell on deaf ears in 
Congress, and not likely to fare better in the Trump Administration. The current five-year plan is in 
effect from 2017 until 2022. Notice of Availability of the 2017–2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and 
Gas Leasing Proposed Final Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 84,612 (Nov. 23, 2016) (announcing the availability 
of the 2017–2022 OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Proposed Final Program). But it may be revised to reflect 
the current administration’s support of fossil fuel dominance. A proposed new five-year plan would 
open the entire OCS to leasing except for Bristol Bay in Alaska, the Eastern Gulf of Mexico, and the 
Marine Sanctuaries. 2019–2024 Draft Proposed Leasing Program, supra note 24; Exec. Order No. 
13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017). 
 175.  OCSLA, Pub L. No. 83-212, § 12(a), 67 Stat. 462, 469 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 
1341(a)). Section 12(b) provided a federal right of first refusal to purchase any minerals in time of war; 
section 12(c) provided authority to suspend lease operations in time of war or natural emergency; 
section 12(d) gave the Secretary of Defense authority (subject to presidential approval) to restrict areas 
from “exploration and operation” in parts of the OCS needed for national defense; section 12(e) reserved 
all uranium in the OCS for the use of the United States; and section 12(f) reserved federal ownership of 
any helium produced as a result of production under a lease. 43 U.S.C. § 1341. 
 176.  See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1031, at 9, 13 (1953) (Conf. Rep.). The Senate version of the bill 
provided the working draft that eventually became law after extensive committee work and revision. See 
Christopher, supra note 53, at 31 (“The bill reported out of Committee was passed by the Senate . . . 
[and] [t]he Senate-House conferees accepted the Senate version . . . . The conference bill was accepted 
by the House by voice vote and in the Senate by the narrow margin of 45-43. The President signed the 
Act on August 7, 1953.”). 
 177.  H.R. REP. NO. 83-1031, at 9–10. 
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President may, from time to time, withdraw from disposition any of the 
unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf and reserve them for the United 
States in the interest of national security.”178 In a letter to the Senate 
Committee, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel pointed out 
that the italicized language was unnecessary because the bill did not require 
that any particular area be leased and that limiting the president’s withdrawal 
authority to national security “may imply that [national security] constitutes the 
only permissible reason for refusing to lease.”179 Accordingly, the language 
was dropped before the bill passed.180 
The Senate Report described section 12(a) as authorizing “the President to 
withdraw from disposition under the act any of the unleased areas of the outer 
shelf. Such a provision is similar to authority given to the President on the 
public domain.”181 This begs the question: What was the president’s power to 
withdraw or revoke withdrawals of public domain lands in 1953 when 
Congress passed OCSLA? First, it is worth emphasizing that executive 
authority over public lands is very broad. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 
the Supreme Court upheld an executive order issued by President Taft that 
withdrew millions of acres of land in Wyoming and California from oil and gas 
prospecting.182 The Court ruled that the president had broad authority to 
withdraw the lands from oil- and gas-related claims, notwithstanding the fact 
that Congress had explicitly made oil-bearing lands subject to private claims 
under the 1872 Mining Law.183 Although no law explicitly authorized such a 
withdrawal, the Court found that presidential power was implicitly granted by 
Congress’s long acquiescence in the exercise of such authority.184 Congress 
abrogated the Midwest Oil rule with the passage of FLPMA.185 While the 
president’s power over the OCS is broad, it is subject to limitations imposed by 
Congress through its own powers over foreign affairs and federal property. 
After all, it was in OCSLA that Congress affirmed President Truman’s 1945 
 
 178.  S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 22 (1953). 
 179.  Id. at 39. 
 180.  Id. at 22. 
 181.  Id. at 14. Use of the term “similar” instead of “identical” supports an inference that Congress 
was aware of the Pickett Act’s grant of authority to withdraw, and to revoke or modify withdrawals, 
while OCSLA section 12 lacks the grant of authority to revoke or modify section 12(a) withdrawals.  
 182.  United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 475 (1915).  
 183.  Id. at 485. 
 184.  See id. at 475 (“The Executive, as agent, was in charge of the public domain; by a multitude 
of orders extending over a long period of time, and affecting vast bodies of land, in many states and 
territories, he withdrew large areas in the public interest. These orders were known to Congress, as 
principal, and in not a single instance was the act of the agent disapproved. Its acquiescence all the more 
readily operated as an implied grant of power in view of the fact that its exercise was not only useful to 
the public, but did not interfere with any vested right of the citizen.”). The Midwest Oil Court relied in 
part on the long-standing practice of creating Indian reservations by executive order. Congress later 
revoked presidential power to make changes in Indian reservation boundaries. Act of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 
299, § 4, 44 Stat. 1347. 
 185.  See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text. 
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assertion of authority over the OCS.186 Thus, the delegated powers should be 
governed by the literal terms of the statute, and in light of its legislative history. 
Absent congressional action, Congress’s limited delegation to make 
withdrawals is just that—limited to making withdrawals. As discussed below, 
when Congress wished to delegate a power to make withdrawals or other land 
reservations, it explicitly included a revocation or modification power. 
In 1953, the primary laws regarding administrative withdrawals from 
unreserved federal lands consisted of the Pickett Act of 1910,187 the Antiquities 
Act,188 and the Forest Reserve Act.189 The Pickett Act authorized the president 
to temporarily withdraw public lands for various purposes with “such 
withdrawals . . . [to] remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of 
Congress.”190 The Pickett Act apparently left in place the permanent general 
withdrawal authority approved in Midwest Oil, but explicitly provided 
revocation authority.191 The Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, building on 
the president’s authority to set up forest reserves, provided that “[t]he President 
is hereby authorized . . . to modify any Executive order that has been or may 
hereafter be made establishing any forest reserve, and by such modification 
may reduce the area or change the boundary lines of such reserve, or may 
vacate altogether any order creating such reserve.”192 The sponsor of the 
quoted language explained that the express delegation of 
revocation/modification authority was necessary because Congress previously 
delegated only the power to create forest reservations.193 Thus, in both the 
Forest Reserve Act (accompanied by the Organic Act) and the Pickett Act, the 
authorization of withdrawal authority was accompanied by an express 
congressional grant of power to the president to revoke or modify the reserved 
or withdrawn area.194 Both statutes differ from the Antiquities Act and OCSLA 
section 12(a), which provide withdrawal authority, but do not have a 
corresponding revocation power. As discussed in the 1938 Attorney General’s 
 
 186.  See S. REP. NO. 83-411, at 7 (1953). 
 187.  Pickett Act, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792. 
 188.  54 U.S.C. § 320301 (Supp. 2017). 
 189.  Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103. While the Forest Reserve Act 
established the authority to create forest reserves, the statute was carried forward in the Forest Service 
Organic Act of 1897. See Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34–36 (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 473–
481 (2012)). For a detailed discussion of these and other authorities, see generally Getches, supra note 5. 
 190.  Pickett Act § 1, 36 Stat. at 847. 
 191.  See Getches, supra note 5, at 298–300 (explaining the continued vitality of executive 
withdrawal authority after the Pickett Act). 
 192.  Act of June 4, 1897, 30 Stat. at 36, repealed in part by National Forest Management Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 9, 90 Stat. 2949, 2957 (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1609(a)). 
 193.  29 Cong. Rec. 2677 (1897) (statement of Sen. Lacey) (“The act of 1890 gave him the power 
to create a reserve, but no power to restrict it or annul it, and there ought to be such authority vested in 
the President of the United States.”).  
 194.  The Pickett Act and Midwest Oil rule were both repealed by Congress in FLPMA’s 
comprehensive revision of the general public land laws. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 § 704(a), 90 Stat. at 2792. 
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Opinion, “if public lands are reserved by the President for a particular purpose 
under express authority of an act of Congress, the President is thereafter 
without authority to abolish such reservation.”195 The logical implication is that 
a congressional delegation of presidential power to reserve an area as a national 
monument does not include an implied revocation power.196 This is also the 
case with respect to marine areas withdrawn pursuant to section 12(a). 
B. OCSLA Section 12(a) Has Consistently Been Used for               
Conservation Purposes 
1. Withdrawals up to the Obama Administration 
As noted earlier, section 12(a) does not identify specific purposes for 
which areas may be withdrawn from oil and gas drilling, although the context 
and legislative history indicates that Congress delegated broad discretion to the 
president.197 President Eisenhower, who signed OCSLA into law in 1953, was 
also the first to make use of section 12(a) withdrawal authority. President 
Eisenhower established the Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve to protect the 
“scenic and scientific values of [the] area unimpaired for the benefit of future 
generations.”198 The proclamation creating the preserve pointed to the “great 
scientific interest and value” of the coral reefs and associated habitat in the 
area, and the possible “commercial exploitation” and “danger of destruction” of 
the reef.199 The proclamation concluded that it was in the “public interest to 
preserve this formation of great scientific and esthetic importance for the 
benefit and enjoyment of the people.”200 The proclamation explicitly relied on 
section 12(a) for authority, and did not have an expiration date.201 Key Largo 
 
 195.  Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney Nat’l Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 186–87 
(1938); see supra text accompanying notes 119–142.  
 196.  See Beermann, supra note 133, at 974. 
Because the President’s successor cannot unilaterally revoke such [monument] designations, 
this action seems to be a good candidate for a President who wants to extend his influence 
beyond his term in office. A President’s policy in favor of designating national monuments is 
likely to bear fruit well beyond that President’s term. Subsequent administrations could 
neglect national monuments, the same as they can subvert the effectiveness of midnight 
regulations by failing to enforce them vigorously. However, the designation is there to stay 
and, in most instances, it is likely to be honored, even by administrations with less 
enthusiasm for the designation. 
Id. 
 197.  See supra notes 175–186 and accompanying text.  
 198.  Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve, Proclamation No. 3339, 25 Fed. Reg. 2352 (Mar. 15, 1960). 
 199.  Id.  
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id. After citing to both the generic conservation authority in section 5 of OCSLA and section 
12(a) in the whereas clauses, the Proclamation cites “particularly [to] section 12(a)” of OCSLA for 
designation of the Reef Preserve, and for the withdrawal of the lands from leasing under OCSLA. Id. 
44.4 ANDERSON V3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/18  1:00 PM 
756 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 44:727 
Coral Reef Preserve was designated as part of a marine sanctuary in 1975202 
and was subsequently incorporated into the Florida Keys National Marine 
Sanctuary in 1990.203 The original Coral Reef Preserve and expanded area thus 
remain protected from mineral development.204 
The second use of the withdrawal authority occurred in the wake of the 
disastrous 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill.205 The Santa Barbara Channel 
Ecological Preserve, established by secretarial order in 1969, withdrew areas 
off of the coast of Santa Barbara and near the Channel Islands from “all forms 
of disposition, including mineral leasing, and reserved [the area] for use for 
scientific, recreational, and other similar uses as an ecological preserve.”206 
This withdrawal was made by the secretary of the interior pursuant to a 
delegation of presidential authority.207 The area remains withdrawn under 
OCSLA.208 In 1998, President Clinton issued an order to “withdraw from 
disposition by leasing for a time period without specific expiration those areas 
of the Outer Continental Shelf currently designated Marine Sanctuaries under 
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972.”209 Until 
President Obama’s withdrawals, this was the last “permanent” withdrawal 
 
 202.  Key Largo Coral Reef Marine Sanctuary, 41 Fed. Reg. 2378, 2379 (Jan. 13, 1976); see CTR. 
FOR NAT. AREAS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES PROGRAM 
61–65 (1977) (describing history of Key Largo Coral Reef protections). 
 203.  Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
605, 104 Stat. 3089 (1990); see Historic Timeline: Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, NAT’L 
OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N, http://floridakeys.noaa.gov/about/timeline.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2017). 
 204.   Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary and Protection Act § 6(b) (“No leasing, exploration, 
development, or production of minerals or hydrocarbons shall be permitted within the Sanctuary.”). 
 205.  See Christine Mai-Duc, The 1969 Santa Barbara Oil Spill That Changed Oil and Gas 
Exploration Forever, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 20, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
ln-santa-barbara-oil-spill-1969-20150520-htmlstory.html; Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 746 
(9th Cir. 1975) (“The [well] blowout caused the disastrous Santa Barbara oil spill which killed birds and 
marine organisms, damaged beaches and seafront properties, and restricted fishing and recreational 
activities in the area.”). 
 206.  Establishment of Santa Barbara Channel Ecological Preserve, 34 Fed. Reg. 5655, 5655–56 
(Mar. 26, 1969).  
 207.  The announcement cites 43 U.S.C. § 1341 (OCSLA), and to Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. 
Reg. 4831 (May 28, 1952), which explicitly delegates presidential authority under the Pickett Act, ch. 
421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910), 
and [includes a delegation of] the authority otherwise vested in him to withdraw or reserve 
lands of the public domain and other lands owned or controlled by the United States in the 
continental United States or Alaska for public purposes, including the authority to modify or 
revoke withdrawals and reservations of such lands heretofore or hereafter made. 
Exec. Order No. 10,355, 17 Fed. Reg. at 4831. Of course, OCSLA did not become law until 1953, and 
unlike the Pickett Act, OCSLA section 12(a) does not contain a grant of authority to modify or revoke 
presidential withdrawals. 
 208.  See Santa Barbara Channel OCS Operations Map, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 
https://www.boem.gov/santa-barbara-map/ (last updated May 10, 2014); Pacific OCS Region Map, 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/pacific-ocs-map/ (last updated Feb. 2017) 
(maps showing Ecological Preserve outside of lease areas). 
 209.  Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
from Leasing Disposition, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1111 (June 12, 1998). 
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order issued. Before reaching the Obama withdrawals, however, the “time-
limited” withdrawals should be noted. 
Starting in 1990, section 12(a) was used to withdraw some areas from 
mineral leasing for a finite period of time. This is well within the scope of the 
congressional delegation of authority, which does not speak to the duration of 
withdrawals. Thus, in 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued a statement 
directing the secretary of the interior not to put up for lease several areas off the 
coasts of Washington and Oregon, and in the Georges Bank in the North 
Atlantic.210 In addition, the statement simply announced “support for a 
moratorium on oil and gas leasing and development” in certain areas off of 
Florida and California until after 2000,211 and directed the agencies to begin the 
process to buy back certain leases off of southwest Florida.212 President Bush’s 
action was based in part on a federal interagency task force report, which 
concluded that there was inadequate environmental information available to 
proceed with leasing in the areas named in the president’s statement.213 The 
statement also indicated agreement with a recommendation by the secretary of 
the interior not to lease or develop areas off of Washington and Oregon until 
after 2000 as part of an environmental protection agenda.214 The president’s 
statement may not have cited section 12(a), but it was undoubtedly meant to be 
binding. As one might expect, in its Proposed Final Program for federal 
offshore oil and gas leasing for the period from 1992 to 1997, the Minerals 
Management Service described the areas included in the statement as having 
been “withdrawn by the President on June 26, 1990.”215 And, like preceding 
withdrawals without temporal limitation in 1960 and 1969, the president’s 
action was taken to protect the environment.216 Congress immediately 
 
 210.  Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1006 (June 26, 1990). The president also ordered the secretary of the interior to commence a 
buyback of several existing leases off the coast of Florida. Id. 
 211.  Id.  
 212.  Id. The president also approved establishment of a National Marine Sanctuary in California’s 
Monterey Bay with a permanent ban on oil and gas development. Id. Proposed regulations, including the 
oil and gas leasing ban, were published in 1990 and finalized in 1992. Monterey Bay National Marine 
Sanctuary Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,310 (Sept. 18, 1992).   
 213.  See Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Development, 26 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1006 (“I have received the report of the interagency OCS Task Force on Leasing and 
Development off the coasts of Florida and California and have accepted its recommendation that further 
steps to protect the environment are needed.”) (citing COMM. TO REVIEW THE OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES PROGRAM, THE ADEQUACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION FOR 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS DECISIONS: FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA 2 (1989)). 
 214.  See id. (regarding Sale Area 132). The president also cancelled Lease Sale 96 in the Georges 
Bank area of the North Atlantic. See id. 
 215.  MINERAL MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PROPOSED FINAL COMPREHENSIVE 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF NATURAL GAS AND OIL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1992–1997, 
at 5 (1992). 
 216.  See generally COMM. TO REVIEW THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF ENVIRONMENTAL 
STUDIES PROGRAM, THE ADEQUACY OF ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION FOR OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS DECISIONS: FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA 2 (1989). 
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confirmed the president’s action in the 1990 Appropriations Act217 and 
continued the moratorium by riders in appropriations bills in subsequent 
years.218 
In 1998, President Clinton relied on section 12(a) to withdraw the areas 
covered by the previously mentioned congressional moratorium through 
2012,219 and Congress continued the moratorium for several more years.220 
This belt-and-suspenders approach was apparently taken to ensure that the 
enumerated areas would remain off limits to mineral leasing even if the 
congressional moratoria were to lapse. The Clinton withdrawals, in place 
through 2012, were modified by President George W. Bush in 2007 to comply 
with congressionally mandated changes.221 President Bush announced further 
changes in 2008, which purported to end the Clinton-initiated moratorium, 
except for the restrictions on leasing in marine sanctuaries.222 The areas 
covered by the congressional moratorium also lapsed after 2008.223 President 
Bush’s action to cut short the Clinton moratorium by four years was not 
challenged.224 
 
 217.  Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
512, § 110, 104 Stat. 1915, 1936 (1990) (“No funds provided in this title may be expended by the 
Department of the Interior for the conduct of offshore leasing and related activities placed under 
restriction in the President’s moratorium statement of June 26, 1990 . . . .”). It is difficult to attach much 
significance to this congressional action, except that for a period of time Congress chose to solidify the 
temporary withdrawals made by the president by precluding the use of funds for any leasing related 
activity in areas subject to the moratorium. The permanent withdrawals in the Florida Keys (1960) and 
off of Santa Barbara (1969) remain in place. 
 218.  Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
154, § 109, 105 Stat. 990, 1012 (1991); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 108, 106 Stat. 1374, 1396 (1992); Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-138, § 107, 107 Stat. 1379, 1398 (1993); 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 107, 
108 Stat. 2499, 2519 (1994); Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, § 111, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-177; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 109, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-200 (1996); Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-83, § 108, 111 Stat. 1, 19 (1997).  
 219.  See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental 
Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1111 (June 12, 1998). 
 220.  Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 
105-277, § 107, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-254 (1998); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, § 107, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-156 (1999); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291, § 107, 114 Stat. 922, 942 (2000). 
 221.  Memorandum on Modification of the June 12, 1998, Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the 
United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 19 
(Jan. 9, 2007). 
 222.  Memorandum on Modification of the Withdrawal of Areas of the United States Outer 
Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 986 (July 14, 2008). 
 223.  Id. Some areas, however, remained restricted under a congressional moratorium. The area off 
limits is in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and the withdrawal is set to expire on June 30, 2022. Tax Relief 
and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 104(a), 120 Stat. 2922, 3003; see VANN, supra 
note 9, at 5. 
 224.  The Eastern Gulf of Mexico withdrawal remains subject to a congressional moratorium. 
VANN, supra note 9, at 5; see BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., 2017–2022 OUTER CONTINENTAL 
44.4 ANDERSON V3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/18  1:00 PM 
2018] PROTECTING OFFSHORE AREAS 759 
2. President Obama’s Withdrawals 
President Obama exercised his authority under section 12(a) 5 times to 
withdraw approximately 160 million acres in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans 
from future mineral leasing for an unlimited time period.225 Four of President 
Obama’s withdrawals were accomplished by executive memoranda,226 while a 
fifth withdrawal was nested inside an executive order establishing the Northern 
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area.227 The vast majority—125 million 
acres—were in Arctic waters.228 Each of President Obama’s withdrawal orders 
explicitly provided that such withdrawals shall be “without specific 
expiration.”229 In addition, the four Arctic withdrawals explicitly mentioned 
and relied upon the importance of the withdrawn areas for “subsistence uses” 
by Alaska Natives. As noted earlier, Alaska Native subsistence rights in the 
OCS are part of the aboriginal title that tribes may possess until such rights are 
extinguished under federal law.230 
The first withdrawal by the Obama Administration was for the Bristol Bay 
area, and was carefully negotiated with various Alaska Native tribes and 
nongovernmental interest groups over a period of years.231 The withdrawal was 
made with “due consideration of the importance of Bristol Bay and the North 
Aleutian Basin Planning Area to subsistence use by Alaska Natives, wildlife, 
wildlife habitat, and sustainable commercial and recreational fisheries, and to 
 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM 1-2 figs.1-1 & 1-2, 4-9 fig.4-4 (2016) (maps 
of planning areas showing area under moratorium). 
 225.  See supra note 18.  
 226.  See id. 
 227.  Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, 
90,670 (Dec. 9, 2016).  
 228.  See, e.g., Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Portions of the United States Arctic Outer 
Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 20, 2016). See Joint 
Statement—United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 
(Dec. 20, 2016); Fact Sheet: President Obama Protects 125 Million Acres of the Arctic Ocean, DEP’T 
OF THE INTERIOR (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2016_arctic_ 
withdrawal_fact_sheet_for_release.pdf. The exterior boundaries of this final withdrawal of about 115 
million acres surrounded the prior Beaufort and Chukchi Sea OCSLA section 12(a) withdrawals, which 
totaled about 9.8 million acres. See Davenport, supra note 17; Boots & Utech, supra note 17. 
 229.  See supra note 18. This contrasts with some earlier withdrawals that included specific end 
dates. See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
from Leasing Disposition, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Mar. 31, 2010) (“Under the authority 
granted to me in section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1341(a), I hereby 
withdraw from disposition by leasing through June 30, 2017, the Bristol Bay area of the North Aleutian 
Basin in Alaska.”); Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer 
Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1111 (June 12, 1998) 
(citing Clinton withdrawal effective through June 30, 2012).  
 230.  See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See Press Release, Pew Charitable Trs., Pew Applauds Protection of Alaska’s Bristol Bay 
(Dec. 16, 2014) (“‘The president’s announcement is a victory for the people of Bristol Bay, who for 
more than 30 years have worked to secure their fishing grounds and ensure that their cultural heritage 
will continue to thrive for generations,’ said Marilyn Heiman, director of Pew’s U.S. Arctic project.”); 
Timeline: Oil and Gas Leasing in Bristol Bay, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www. 
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2010/10/timeline-oil-and-gas-leasing-in-bristol-bay. 
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ensure that the unique resources of Bristol Bay remain available for future 
generations.”232 One of the coalition leaders praised the withdrawal in the 
following terms: “Last month, President Barack Obama removed the North 
Aleutian Basin from the federal offshore oil and gas leasing program. . . . His 
decision was supported by 20 seafood companies and trade associations who 
operate in the region as well as 50 tribes and Native organizations from 
Western Alaska and the Interior.”233 Alaska Republican Senator (and Chair of 
the United States Senate Energy Committee) Lisa Murkowski did not object to 
the decision, “given the lack of interest by industry and the public divide over 
allowing oil and gas exploration in this area.”234 
Just over a month later, President Obama withdrew from mineral leasing 
activity several carefully delineated areas in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
(Hannah Shoal, Barrow Canyon, and a twenty-five-mile coastal buffer).235 The 
Alaska Native community opposed oil and gas drilling previously proposed in 
these areas.236 The areas withdrawn provide habitat for whales, walrus, and 
other marine mammals important for Native subsistence uses.237 The 
importance of these areas is underscored by prior litigation in which Alaska 
Natives asserted aboriginal claims in order to limit offshore oil and gas 
development, and in comments consistently made on prior five-year leasing 
plans.238 Thus, President Obama made the withdrawal “with due consideration 
 
 232.  Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
from Leasing Disposition, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 16, 2017). 
 233.  Norm Van Vactor, In Support of a Permanent Withdrawal of Bristol Bay from Offshore 
Drilling, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.adn.com/commentary/article/ 
permanently-removing-bristol-bay-offshore-drilling-better-surprise-mega-sanctuary/2015/01/23/. 
 234.  Marie L. La Ganga, Obama Protects Alaska’s Bristol Bay from Oil and Gas Drilling, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-bristol-bay-leases-20141216-
story.html. 
 235.  See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental 
Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 27, 2015) 
(delineating those areas with a map of the withdrawn areas attached to the Memorandum); see also 
BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 224, at 4-4 figs.4-1 & 4-2 (showing maps as well). The 
Proposed plan was approved in a Record of Decision published at the very close of the Obama 
Administration. Record of Decision for the 2017–2022 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing 
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 6643 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
 236.  The map of the areas withdrawn show their importance to Alaska Native whaling and 
subsistence uses of marine mammals. Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United 
States Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1 (Jan. 27, 2015); see also BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 224, at 4-4 fig.4-2.  
 237.  PEW CHARITABLE TRS., SAFEGUARDING IMPORTANT AREAS IN THE U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN 
(2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/08/safeguarding_important_areas_in_the_arctic_ 
ocean_v8.pdf. 
 238.  See People of the Village of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(concerning an action to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior’s sale of oil and gas exploration leases in the 
Bering Sea on the Outer Continental Shelf of Alaska); Inupiat Cmty. of Arctic Slope v. United States, 
548 F. Supp. 182, 185 (D. Alaska 1982) (“The Inupiat again challenge the lease-sale made in the 
Beaufort Sea in 1979. They assert that they possess sovereign rights and unextinguished aboriginal title 
to the area lying from three to sixty-five miles off-shore in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas of the Arctic 
Ocean.”); see also Comments of the Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope on the Draft Environmental 
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of the critical importance of certain areas within the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas 
to subsistence use by Alaska Natives as well as for marine mammals, other 
wildlife, and wildlife habitat, and to ensure that the unique resources of these 
areas remain available for future generations . . . .”239 
The third withdrawal was part of an executive order creating the Northern 
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area.240 The order contained the most explicit 
description of the need for the withdrawal, and established an intertribal body 
to advise federal agencies carrying out various activities in the area: 
The Bering Intergovernmental Tribal Advisory Council shall be charged 
with providing input and recommendations on activities, regulations, 
guidance, or policy that may affect actions or conditions in the Northern 
Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area, with attention given to climate 
resilience; the rights, needs, and knowledge of Alaska Native tribes; the 
delicate and unique ecosystem; and the protection of marine mammals and 
other wildlife.241 
The order included additional directives to various federal agencies 
intended to protect marine habitat, prepare for possible oil spills, exercise care 
in development of new shipping routes, develop plans regarding the discharge 
from vessels, and preclude future bottom trawling. Central to carrying out the 
mission of the executive order is the use of traditional knowledge from the 
indigenous people who live nearby and who have relied on the resources for 
centuries. To that end, agencies were ordered to include traditional knowledge 
in all planning for federal actions and activities in the Northern Bering Sea 
Climate Resilience Area.242 The withdrawal and executive order were a major 
 
Impact Statement – Beaufort Sea and Chukchi Sea Planning Areas – Oil & Gas Sales 209, 212, 217, and 
221, at 2 (March 30, 2009) (“We are generally opposed to offshore oil leasing, exploration, and 
development because of the threats they pose to the subsistence resources of the Arctic.”); Letter from 
North Slope Borough Mayor, Charlotte E. Brower, to Mr. James F. Bennett re: 5-Year Program Draft 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, at 2 (Jan. 9, 2012) (“Since the Borough’s Incorporation 
in 1972, our leaders have taken a consistent stand in opposition to offshore leasing, exploration, and 
development. . . . The adverse impacts from an oil spill, especially a large spill, would be devastating to 
our communities, our ability to our communities, our ability to feed ourselves, and the continued 
viability of the Inupiat culture.”). 
 239.  Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 27, 2015). President 
Obama had inherited several active leases in Arctic waters from his predecessor, which were fraught 
with problems associated with the difficulty of operating and exploring in harsh Arctic waters. See 
Michael LeVine et al., Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean: Past Problems Counsel Precaution, 37 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1351–57 (2014). Industry relinquished the vast majority of its leases after 
these problems. See Dan Joling, Shell Relinquishes Offshore Leases in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2016), https://apnews.com/b995f7949d4c4033846959d486acf7cb/shell-
relinquishes-offshore-leases-alaskas-chukchi-sea. 
 240.  Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, 
90,670 (Dec. 9, 2016). 
 241.  Id. at 90,671. 
 242.  Id.  
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step forward in terms of Alaska Native tribal involvement and influence to 
protect a vast area of the Bering Sea.243 
The final area withdrawn from leasing off the Alaska coast encompassed 
almost the entire Arctic Ocean.244 Obama announced the withdrawal in 
conjunction with a larger United States-Canada Arctic agreement, where “both 
countries committed to defining new approaches and exchanging best practices 
to strengthen the resilience of Arctic communities and continuing to support the 
well-being of Arctic residents, in particular respecting the rights and territory of 
Indigenous peoples.”245 As with the other Arctic withdrawals, President Obama 
pointed explicitly to the importance of the marine habitat to subsistence uses as 
part of his justification. At the same time, the massive size of the withdrawal 
was plainly the trigger causing the Alaska congressional delegation and oil and 
gas industry to urge the Trump Administration to revoke the Obama 
withdrawal orders.246 
Each of these withdrawals is significant in the recognition of the 
importance of Alaska Native subsistence uses to the tribes in the area. As 
discussed earlier, Alaska Native tribes arguably retain aboriginal rights to hunt, 
fish, and gather in these areas as a matter of federal law.247 Indeed, much like 
Northwest Indian rights to fish, the uses of marine mammals by Alaska Natives 
“were not much less necessary to the existence of the [Alaska Natives] than the 
atmosphere they breathed.”248 The Obama OCSLA withdrawals were made in 
large part to protect the marine environment from the demonstrated and 
inherent dangers in oil and gas exploration and production in the Arctic, and to 
prevent a major oil spill in the Arctic. The environmental protection objectives 
of the Obama withdrawals are consistent with the past use of the withdrawal 
authority by Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, G.H.W. Bush, Clinton, and G.W. 
Bush. The indigenous rights and protection elements, as well as the history of 
failed efforts to drill in Arctic waters make the Arctic withdrawals even more 
compelling, and the best interpretation of the statute is that the withdrawals for 
a “time period without expiration” cannot be undone by a subsequent president. 
This is addressed in the next subpart. 
 
 243.  See Press Release, President Obama Signs Executive Order to Protect the Northern Bering 
Sea (Dec. 9, 2016), available at http://www.beringseaelders.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-
White-House-Executive-Order-12-9-16.pdf.  
 244.  See Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Arctic Outer 
Continental Shelf from Mineral Leasing, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 20, 2016) (designating 
a large Arctic withdrawal). 
 245.  Joint Statement—United States-Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement, 2016 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1, 1 (Dec. 20, 2016). 
 246.  As noted above, the December 2016 Arctic withdrawal consumed approximately 115 million 
acres of the approximately 160 million acres withdrawn. See Davenport, supra note 17. 
 247.  See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text.  
 248.  United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
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3. The Trump Administration Response 
President Donald Trump issued an executive order on April 28, 2017 that 
purported to revoke all of President Obama’s section 12(a) withdrawals, except 
for Bristol Bay.249 It left in place the prior withdrawals applicable to designated 
marine sanctuaries, but also mandated a review of all marine sanctuary and 
marine national monument designations or expansions affected within the ten 
years prior to the date of the order.250 The Trump Administration’s reaction 
was foreshadowed by cries of outrage from the Alaska congressional 
delegation.251 The Trump Order parallels another executive order calling for 
review of all terrestrial monument designations of one hundred thousand acres 
or more since January 1, 1996.252 The OCLSA revocation order directly raises 
the question of whether a subsequent president has the authority to revoke or 
modify a section 12(a) withdrawal.253 As discussed above, because the 
withdrawal was made pursuant to a limited congressional delegation of 
authority, a new president may not simply revoke it with the stroke of a pen, as 
some have asserted. Moreover, the withdrawal authority in section 12(a) is 
distinct from the five-year leasing program set forth in the OCSLA, which 
 
 249.  Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 20,815, 20,816 (2017). The Order accomplishes this by replacing the text in the prior orders: 
The body text in each of the memoranda of withdrawal from disposition by leasing of the 
United States Outer Continental Shelf issued on December 20, 2016, January 27, 2015, and 
July 14, 2008, is modified to read, in its entirety, as follows:  
Under the authority vested in me as President of the United States, including section 
12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 1341(a), I hereby withdraw 
from disposition by leasing, for a time period without specific expiration, those areas of 
the Outer Continental Shelf designated as of July 14, 2008, as Marine Sanctuaries under 
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1431–1434, 
33 U.S.C.1401 et seq. 
Id. Section 4(c) of the Trump Executive Order revokes the Obama Executive Order establishing the 
Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order No. 13,754, 81 Fed. Reg. 90,669, (Dec. 9, 2016), 
which contains a large OCSLA withdrawal. Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. at 20,816. 
 250.  Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. at 20,816.  
 251.  See Press Release, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, Alaska Delegation Reacts to Stunning Arctic 
Withdrawal: Obama Locks up the Arctic, Denies Economic Opportunity for Alaskans (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.murkowski.senate.gov/press/release/alaska-delegation-reacts-to-stunning-arctic-
withdrawal. A more muted response followed an earlier decision to remove areas from possible leasing 
under the 2012–2022 Program. See Jack Fitzpatrick, Obama Administration Pulls Arctic Leases from 
Offshore Drilling Plan, MORNING CONSULT (Nov. 18, 2016), https://morningconsult.com/2016/11/18/ 
obama-administration-pulls-arctic-leases-offshore-drilling-plan/. 
 252.  Review of Designations under the Antiquities Act, Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 
20,429, 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017). The secretary of the interior established a monument review process, 
which includes a list of the monuments under review. Review of Certain National Monuments 
Established Since 1996; Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,016, 22,016 (May 
11, 2017). 
 253.  The first lawsuit challenging the attempt to revoke the withdrawals was filed on May 3, 2017, 
less than a week after the order was signed, and the same day it was published in the Federal Register. 
League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (D. Alaska May 3, 2017). See Margaret 
Kriz Hobson, Trump Lawyers, Enviros Square Off over Drilling Expansion ENERGYWIRE (Nov. 9, 
2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060066103. 
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provides discretion to the secretary of the interior to leave areas out of lease 
sale planning. Rather, the section 12(a) authority is a “one-way” delegation of 
Congress’s power over the OCS, and similar to the Antiquities Act, there is no 
grant of revocation power to the president.254 
The 2017–2022 leasing program excluded most areas in the Arctic from 
lease sales, and as noted above, the entire area was placed off limits by 
President Obama’s withdrawals. The 2017–2012 leasing program could be 
amended or revised by following the statutory process to include excluded 
areas,255 but may not extend to areas withdrawn by the president under section 
12(a). Because these areas were withdrawn under section 12(a) for a period 
“without expiration,” any leasing or related activity is precluded unless and 
until Congress provides otherwise. The express delegation of authority to 
withdraw areas leaves with Congress the decision of whether and when such 
withdrawals should be revoked. When a congressional grant of authority is 
clear, it is limited by the terms Congress used, and here Congress granted 
authority to withdraw areas from mineral leasing under section 12(a), but not to 
revoke or amend the withdrawals previously made. The Supreme Court 
recently reminded us that “it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid 
statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have 
done had it faced a question that . . . it never faced.”256 The terms of OCSLA as 
written limit presidential authority to making withdrawals. That should be the 
end of the matter unless Congress acts. 
CONCLUSION 
For over one hundred years, presidents of both parties used executive 
power delegated by Congress in the Antiquities Act to protect important objects 
of historic, scientific, and natural interest. But until the second half of the 
twentieth century, little attention was given to marine life, resources, and 
habitat in need of protection. After initially viewing marine areas as primarily 
important for commerce and mineral exploitation, the federal government has 
taken a variety of approaches to protecting marine areas. While Congress has 
paramount authority over all public lands and the outer Continental Shelf, 
President Obama’s protective measures taken under the Antiquities Act and 
OCSLA may only be altered by Congress. As demonstrated above, President 
Trump lacks delegated authority to reverse the withdrawal orders made under 
section 12(a) of the OCSLA by President Obama. This leaves the ultimate 
 
 254.  Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (describing the five-year leasing program), with 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a) (describing the withdrawal authority). See supra Part III.B.  
    255.     That process is underway on the Trump Administration’s assumption that the president has 
the authority to revoke a section 12(a) withdrawal. See supra notes 24–25. 
 256.  Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017). 
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authority with Congress and is consistent with that body’s plenary authority 
over public lands and the limited authority delegated to the president. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online 
journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact cse.elq@law.berkeley.edu. Responses to articles 
may be viewed at our website, http://www.ecologylawquarterly.org. 
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